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Historically, sube^rin«s h*«vft b^«*n mafej«%ct t© the same
rules of internationel lav* tfeat ,«;©v«m ths conduct of surface
vessels during their actions sgainst belligerent shirpin^.
Although the London Protocol of 1936 bound 4^ nations to
this eoneept, the traditional Isw was consistently violated
during World ^^^ttr II • Are subaarlnes exempt fr&m tht long
standini^ restrictions on bellire-rent riil^tts st sea or has
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Conditions in International Society Influencing Develoraent
of Rules of Submarine Varfare
A, lapact ©f Submarine as Rew Weap®n df Warfare
The arrival of a new weapon ©n the International scene
can be likened to the birth ©f a child. One legitimately
wonders if the initial agony, the floundering attempts at
formulating rules of conduct, are worth the flush of success
when respectability is achieved* Although conceived in
earlier tisics, the subaarine as we know it is basically a
child of the twentieth century. During the course ©f two
irerld wars it has gained int«»mational r^ccepta^^ce as a
weapon, if not international respectability. Although the
voapoB itself appears t© have reached jjiajority, the Maturity
©f the rules which govern its conduct have bees qu<?stioned
and thus will be considered in soite detail,
1. DevelOTMont
The first comaissioned AiB*rican submarine v;as the
Holland , which was accepted by the Navy in 1900. Other
•o«going nations throughout the world had launched, or
would be launching, similar submersibles. The concept of a
vossel capable of operating on, and under, the ocean iitaks by
2
no mesns new. Legend credits Alexander the Great with a
1 Sea Power 390 (F.B. Potter & C.W, Niaitz ed. 1960).




«R/^ ;. i'; f>' .' t'j'*^
3p ^rf^w^J-J




rf -^f^ CS '^'
1>*T I
>J -2-1 *A-





trip t© the oc«>en tlear In a watertight glasr barrel wk«re ht
confronted a whale*
Throufihout history other attempts at «ub«erg;ln|: in some
type of wat^rtifht coapsrtfacnt hsve b«en recorded, and
self-propelled vessels capable of erratic op«ratior beneath
tlie mirface were not uncoiaon in th*» l^th and 19th centuries*
The first subaarine for war purposes was an Aiaerican innova*
tion, the Turtle , which was used unsuccessfully against the
British fl<^et durini? the Revoltiomary War,^ It war not
until the Civil V^^r that the first warship was sunk by a
•ubaarine. This was the Union Housatonic which sank in
Charleston hi*rbor following an attack by the Confederate
•ubaarine Hunley .^ Thereafter, both the Union &n6 the
Confederacy cjcperiaented with subnarine vessels but achieved
no notable success.^ None of these early vessels wore
considered sufficiently reliable to be accepted by the
navies of th* world, and it was not until l^^^ that the
french launched the first coai^^issioned 8ub«arine, tho
7Gyanote »
3 See Id, at 1-4.
^ 1^. at 4-7.
5 I^, it ll-12.Unfortun4'tely, ^he Kunley and her crew also
went down with the Housfetonle . The state of the subwarine
£rt durin*; the Civil W^r is f'videnced by the fact that on
five previous occasions the Hunley had sunk to the bottoM
out of control vdth S( tot««l loss ©f thirty-five crewmen.
^ Id. at 13-15,
7 Thi Power 390 (E.B. Potter k C.W, Niaitz ed. I960).
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After 190c piropresE was steady and wh^n fe#rld ''.•sr I
b*f<3in th<* subiaarine had developed to such s defree as td be
a BAJer factor in warfare. The Geraans in pcrticuHr found
t)$i8 new weapen te be nof t effective find its i^^et w«t8 se
great thet ©nly the ce»blned efforts of the British and
United States Flef*ts prevented strsn^l^stion ©f the British
ftiplre.
? WorlH V/jir I Allied l/osses '
The GersRftn U-b«at in fact very nearly won the war f©r
the Axis powers. Althou|^ 1^7 U-b©at8 were Isst by the
Gerssns, the U-boat fleet sunk, either through direct attuck
er through jaine-laylng, 5|^34 allied aierchant ves els.° la
addition they snnk 10 battleships, IS cruisers, 20 destroyers,
and 9 submarines.
^
3. W^rld 'var II l/osseg
The 3uba.=srlne*8 success was repeated dui*lng World V/sr
II. Axis U-boats again ©early proved t® be the decisivo
weapen, and are credited with the destruction ©f 2,775
allied vessels. Anerlcan subasrines in the Pacific ale*
achieved notable succesB durin. th^ saaie conflict and ere
credited with the sinking of 1,17^ Japanese Merchant vessels,
as well as 214 warships.
^ Id. at 474. This aaounted t© a loss of 12,1^5,^^32 Gross
Register Tons.
9 Id. ? t 475.
10 L^. at 564. Anountlng to a loss of 14,573,000 tons.























Tfes f»r«f,»inf statistics ,?rspKi€6lIy illustrst^? tfes
pre-ejnin^nce •f the subaa*rine in tfc# fi^l4 #r c^mm^rc*
destruction. H»w«v«r, frsra a fuuctl -n.?! stsn^p^int, the sub-
serine Is cl^srly n»t lli?iited f this sn© activity, and tb«
12
rec«rc*a are replete v?itJ? examples ef tfeis ve«p#n»s versatility*
The scepe ef this writing, hevs'ever, vlll he llnit^^iS ts a
c»nsic!€r*^ti»n sf tbe rele 0f the subms-rine In cetjmerc©
destruction, benbardiBent , &n^ bl»cks4e, aad the lef»l Iss^ues
arlslnf fr»a this r®le.
B« Rvelutiyn frg^ Terrttprlally Limited f Teti^l 'warfare
Th** rulee ef n&vgl if»rfi«rs* eYslve^ frosi the prsctices
sad cu3t«3i3 ef tb«» ,-rfgt si«ritim<^ ^^wers, isn«t t^*lr validity
was <S«terT,in€d Isrrely by the e«ntlnuinf: wllllnffiesf? «f
these pewfTS te sbieJ® by tte«E« lis srder tm pr©parly evaluate
tlse existing; rultf; it is n^-cessary t© devote s®ne thiufht t#
tKcir srijr^in as well ss the cen^iitiens in intenaatianal
ssciety w^^lch influenced tb^ir dev<?l®ri!?»<*nt»
!• Chsn.-^-e In CeofT^rbic '"c^pe
^»Bt early vars v.'ere limited in sc«»pe n«t enly ss te
the f:ee raphic ^res c<&neerrjec% but sis® us tu tVfi p^rcfntage
•f * n^tior-^'s pepul«tl»n actually involved in cembctant
activity. Battle© were nemslly f«uf:kt in tl.* terrltery ef
m iWj "' ' " " " —
A* £ee Id,,
-.t 506»5^2 fer exanaples ef Sf-cial mlsslens per-












•ne of the b«lllf::erents Qn<i l:ad littl© direct effect on the
world at Isrp-©. On l^nd th* fu^dal militarlsa in Furope
g«v« rise t« a military class society with « virtual
Monopoly on arms. This in effect deprived the peasant and
town-dweller of the means for fi^tin^ c^urinir «©st of the
fuedal period. At sea the transportation of wealth in the
font of goods led to the institution of piracy and the
increase of overseas coauaerce led to clash»*s between rival
trado interests. Since merchant vessels as a class were
poorly equipred to defend tbessselves, seafsring communities
early set aside certain vessels to act as mon-of-wsr to
protect the cow^erical shipping, thus giving rise to the
11
concept of the ruaYy * •'^
Toward the close of the Middle Ages, two forces arose,
wVich, in coabinati^n with other factors, would lead to aa
expansion in the scope of warfare. One of these was the
concept of nationalism, which r<?sulted in the establishiaent
of the new European systea of sovereign states. These
monarchies developed standing araies with professional forces
traditionally led by the unemployed fuedal nobility and
ee»pesed of foot-loose co^on^ners. This type of military
erganiKation fought the various religious and polictico-ece-
no«ic wars prior to the time of Napoleon, but the French
Revolution ushered in » new era in warfare. The aristocratic
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Monopoly in K^ilitsry leadership ceiised, and the professional
soldiery found itself ©utnwsibored by citizens called for tho
defense of the rerublic. Revolutionary idealism node war tho
concern of the nation «s a whole. ^^
The second factor acting ss a catalyst in this situation
was tho frowth of co®saerce» Trade in the Baltic and the
Koditerranean poaed problems of reflation and control over
aerchants &nd shipping. Kxpanding populations required laoro
goods and wore Isnd. The discovery of the new world opened
new vistas for trade and exploration. Progress in the art of
navi ration permitted sierchant vessels and their attendent
•n-of-war to conteaplato veysfos far in excess of the usual
eoast hugging trade expeditions, and ships began to venture
15farther and farther Into the open sea. As national interest
la aariti^BO com:^erce grew, so did the interest in protecting
that valuable commodity by increaf^ing the si^JO and 8tr«f"n|5th
of the guardian navsl vessels, ^tutual agreea»ents and coaspli-
ontary customs offered some Insurance a^^ainst aiutual
disruption and consequently doctrines respecting the rii^ts
and duties of belligerents at sea be^an to develop.
2. Techno! orical Change
luring this sawe period a revolution in technology was
beginning. The development of gunpowder antiquated the man
14 See II K.G. Wells, The Outline of History 724 34 (1961).
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in antor. The ??r&wlnf pepulstione gav** larrer nutnb«"r«i to be
aroiedf and !sachine technology w»» p«i0«d r«§dy to wakf every
an a soldier* As steaa and ir<!>n rerlsc«»d &all i»nd wsed,
nations found thesaselvea bound tofethe^r in alliances ba©«*d
on political, Ideolorlcsl, ®nd ee^noaic Interests, or on
cecesaity, ^nd ensajed in conflicts with "common oae^iea**
which Involved freat land aassi^s smd ocean bodif^s. To aeet
the doaands of such warfare new and better wearons were
required &n6 produced, and rules wore propounded to f:overn
tbe uae of these weapons.
The twentieth century hfts seen fantastic advances in
all fonis of technology. Nuclear enr^rry is available both
68 a fuel and as a woftpon* l-Sowever, as will be dem©nstrst©d
borein, the gssjerlty of the rules now defamed applicable to
the subaarine antedsito the submarine itself as well as tho
advanced potential it now enj'^ys. One question which may
woll bo consld red as rsiised by the experience of the t^^
aajer wars of t is century is whether the old rules sre to
bo considered applicable by anabgy or whether now rules which
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Desirable ^»llcl«s for the rev^lor^-fient •f the t&v gf
V^ubia^ri n g 'a rfar
e
A, Basle Huaianitarlsn C««ls
Frefli th^ beglnnini: it ra«y be asnif^ed that wan has been
aware thi^t tbe very faet ©f his humanity requires s^sRse 8®rt
•f limitation on his wflrtiiae activity. Rocognitlon of this
lisiitation finds expression in the basic dlstir.ctloB drevm
between c©:abatantB and noncooibstants, and by thf? efforts to
offer soac sort of protection to both, ^^utrals, as non-
parties to a conflict, represent a particular kind of non-
ombatant, ^nd are alao accorded certain basic rights in their
relationship to the parties on^a .red in th*^ conflict. Thero-
fore, as a start! ni^ point in the eonsldoration of suba^rino
^^ This is ls?plicit in the iraris;>uB codifiostlons of rules
l^overnlnr ppeclflc aspf^cts ef wirfftr#. For exs??4p'le: Article 4
of Hague Convention IX of 1907 prohibits bowbardment of
undefended arese, w? ich presumably would be occupied by non-
combat s^nts; Article ?2 of the London Hsval Protocol of 1936
require that the noncombsitr^nt r-.-pv ',ni^ pacne-nfers of merchant
vessels bo placed in eafety before their ship is destroyed;
Articl«r 3 «»f the 1949 f^^eneva Convention for th?? ^aelioretion
of the Condition of the Weunded, Slek, end Shipurrockfd Kesibers
of Aroted Forces ^t Sea, re^ulr^r cer*.&ir! n^.lnlRe-;K st ndftr^'^s of
treatment in the ease of, **(! ) Persons taking no active ysrt
in the hoFtl'^ltlf-n, including ^e-^b'^rs of amed f^srces. whc havo
laid d©v*n their arms.,,.** Colonbos notes the distinction as
fe3To^"R, "?h*5!<^ rul-^s (%f thr jpws of n-val wr.rfare tkvt ^s?.bodied
in tlie practice of the principal naval powers... as betwoen
th''- belllferents the»^seives, their rirhts tiust be exf^rclsed
in accordance with the curt©-';ary law of nstionp and the
principlfts «f huaanity and chivalry, and that in their execu-
tion, the livee of noncoabetant encsa; persrns aaust not be







warfare, tbre<* b«sic huaanltarlsn geala may be postulit^d
tT9m tbas« baaic distinctions*
Th« first «f th«se ^oala le th« prevention «f unneces^siy
c«8U9lti««8 asonft the c«»batant forces of the enei^y. ^mmng
th© cu»t0a»ry rules of warfare* oni? ®f th# baaic principles ©f
tha law af war is the principle ©f humanity. This has beaa
17
stated in the f®ll©vdiR|f terns:
The principle ef humanity prohibits
the «»pleya«mt of any kind ®r defT*»%
•f farce net nec<»SKsry for th« purpeat
•f the war, i.e., f®r the prrtisl ar
ce«plete sxibssisf i®n ©f the enemy with
the least passible expenditure ef
tiae, life, and physical resaurees*
2* Pratg^ctlon af fgencewbatants
Tha principle mf hieaanity Is abvlously equally j^ppli cable
to nencambatants. One af the lenitiati^te aiies in warfare is
« direct attack an belligerent combatant ferces, but this Is
net true in the ease of n©nc9«ifoatants , who in snosjt circua-
stances are entitled te ©ore c©nsider®tl«»n thJtn that afforded
by tbe principle of huasanity alone* This oansiderati^an has
been expresj^ed as f^llovsfs:^
Under custeiaary interns^ti-^nfi'l law, individuals
wh© d© not f©r»a a part of the araied forces
and wh© refrain fr^si the eot^jaisston ©f all
acts of hostility »ust be eaferuarded afainct
injury not incidental to military ©pffretions
directed agalnt^t combatant farces and ©ther
17 U.S. Dep»t ©f SavXf ^''^'^^ 10-?, Law of n&y&l Warfare
pare. ?2Ca (195*^) ZE<*J"«in«^ter cited us Naval Warfare/.
i^ Id. ^t para. 221b.
•9-





Rilltsry •bjf^ctivf^s. In particular, it
is forbidden t« a«ke n«»n-e«sab«tsnt» tk«
•bj«ct •f * dir«ct attsck by the Aim«<l
f»rc«s ©f a b«lli!r«r«nt, if such att.'^ck
l8 unr«ldt«d t« a ailitary ©bj^ctive*
Attftck fttr th« 8#le purpOvSi^ •? terror! rlo|r
tb« civilisit p#|>u]j[tl»n is al«* ferbiddcn,
Thi» e^ftcept ar«st, ««st probably, froai tb© early idi^aX
•f chivalry, which r«quir«d a certsia f6ira«er in •ff«n8« and
dftfesiae and sutusl r«sp#et b»tw««n e«ibatants, th« dcslrtt t^r
19ict©ry notvithstiinding* Wbil« it is »rguabl« t^«t tJa*
d«per5«n«li%atl«ii tff tb« A«d«rn df^strrjetlre process, ss
•id«nc«d by aass boffibing rfilds, ati»«ic tr^apt^ne, ajEid 9h«9t
•n sight submarine tactics, ba« rendered this c^nc^pt ®b»«let«^
,
tiktt better yi«w is that this luperBanel 8l»uifet«r ««k<^s tbe
Xl»iting: facter inhf^rent In th« principal ef huBnanity «v«n &
»#r« urfeut requirement.
3. RlffffJEBlUfn ?|: !.>utrsl^t^y
Th« finfil {>eetul$ted geal fer ceisaider&tien is tbe
recegnitien ef neutriality. Keutrslity ie d«fin«*d ss the
veI«Bit«riXy assun^d stitu£ ef nen^participstl on in a p«rtic»
olar cenfliet «nd this atatua «ay be diacentlsue'd ^^t the
diacr^^tien af the neutral state which enjeys ne rights ether
th»n theae grs>nted t© neutrals in tiae ef war by the ?ren«r«l
20
principles ef interndtianal law, Tke status ef neutrality
sbeuld be distinquiahi>d frets the atstus ef th«r «rr-.f»ll«d
19 -ee Stene^ Ufsl Contrela ef lRti?rn®ti©nal Cenfliet 335-41
(1959) ^S^reiaafter cited as Starve? .
20 g.H. Brittin 1 LB, ^^atsen .International l,aw fmr Sae>»iBg
dfficfra 22 (1960)/]S[ereinafter cited fts Brittin h ate^^/*
-10-
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''Btutr&llsed** states. Neutr&IisAtlDa is & c«nditi«n #f perm-
anent neutrality iMp««ed ^n a state, fenerally by treaty, and
21
guaranteed by other states,
fr-^tm a huaanitsrlan standpoint, rec^jRniti^n ef neutrality
serves at least twe ends. First it tends te lliait the nuniber
•f states actually engA^ed as belligerents in a piven csnfl ict,
and secandly it extends generic rirhts as nencembatants te
natianals ef the neutral state. Kewev<^r, altfeettidi the practice
in this regard has bepn subject t© ereeien, neutrals are
^•aereliy recegnized te have rif;ht8 in excess ef these accerd*
22
•4 te neaeeaabatant natienals ef a belliger'^nt state. The
extent ef this eresien >d.ll be censidered herein.
B. Military Necessity
It is uncentreverted that th« prlaary geal ef any bellig-*
erent in any eenflict is te win. It is alse likely that any
21 Swit2«?!rland is tJie prime ex^aple ef a neutrall7.ed state,
?ee Hrittin k ia'atson at 22.
22 Tfee Best legical rig^ht t» adhere t® a neutral v?®uld ef
caurse be frced->ss from ctttack »f s>ny kind. Historically neutrals
were permitted te carry en trsde ataeng each ether and aaeng
belligerents eubjt*ct enly te havinr certain itesss intercepted
and eenfi seated as contraband when ene party te a conflict
feund such feeds destined for any enesy. Lefjitinate geeds
feund en beard neutral ©r enei^y vesj^elswere nersaally net sub-
ject te cenfiscation. As re/?:ar s indiyiduals, neutr&l natienals
cust«'narily enjeyed free perrenal aevement rej^ardless ef
hestill^ies. ^eutr*l aaeritisne prizes f^^und to be laden with
centrab^nd i^eods were exempt frem desstructien. Threats ef an
araed neutrlity t© take reprisals fer encroach'nent ef these
ri^^ts eperat*d as a sanction as lenj^ as ene er aere sjajer








? V >"'^ I'
if<» i<»
as. •:? « i-»
'
ijfflTSL af -"' * r f
^S
«!.'
b«llif«r9nt will Attempt to »chl«v« this victory by utilising
tho lieaiia that he, not international society, de«M& necossary*
Therefore, sny eonsidorotlon of huaaanitsrian goal^i In warfare
loads necessarily to fi discussion of the doctrine of ailit«ry
necessity.
!• In Conflict with Basic Osftjls
The principle, or doctrine, of sjilitftry necesisity h«s
been variously defined Bn^ 4ntert5r«*ted. The Oermsn jurists
heve, in the past, acceptOf^ it ss r^eaning that, **«,• s
violation of the Iftws of vsr must be recorded &b not having
tfiken place if the «ilitary operstion is neceseory for the
preservation of the troops or the «v«rtinf, of « danfer that
thr<^atens then atnd csnnot be averted in any other way, or
ovwi if it is advantageous either for the effectual carrying
out of a ailitfiry enterprise not Inad-aissible in itself or
for the ©ecurinir of its success,^ -^ This i?ppro«ch is in
eoasonaseo with a Geman saxim to the effect th«t neccesity
la war overrules the manner of warfare. ^^
C. Fesolution of the Conflict
It is obvious that International application of the
lews cited above would lead to complete negation of any &esi>«
lance of humanitarian order. Y«^t, It Is obvious also that
necessery military operations auct be conpleted if victory is
^3 C.J« Colopbos. International Law of the Soa 501 (6th ed.
1967) /hereinafter cited as Colowbos/
-17-






these •pp«8lnf c»nsid#rati®ns must be reached.
Evidence th&t internatidniil ^seciety has net sdepted the
dectrine ef siilltary neces?»lty te the exclusion of hi»fin-
Itcrisn censideratlens ean b« feund* The preamble te Ka^e
Cenventlon IV, Hespecting the Laws and Custea* ef War •»
X^ndf recited that military Kpcessity had b«*^ii t&ken late
acci>unt vi^en the llrr.iting rul#8 were drafted* The prevail-
ing British, Aaerlcen, Fre«ch, ;.nd Italian int<^rpret«ti»B
appears te li»it the dectrine's applicability te eases ef
nationjftl self-preservation. ' sn intem4:tianal tribunal has
o^esidered the dectrlne in the fellemng i«iifuage:
military necees^ity has been inveked by the
defendants an justifying the killirif ef
innecent met?*bers ef the pepul«tien sn6^ the
destructien ef villages md tewns in the
occupied territory. Military necessity per-
mits a belligerent, subject te the laws ef
war, te apply eny a«eunt and kind ef force
te c&aipel the ce«rl<pte suboaissien ef the
enetay with the least possible exp«nditure
of tiae, life, &nd noney. In general it
sanctions measures by an ©ccupant n®cess«sry
to protect the sefety of his forces and to
facilitate the success of his peratlons*
It ponaits the destruction of life of
armed eaoBlos and other persons whoso
dostruetloa is incidentally unavoidable
by the arwed conflicts of v-er; but it does
not penalt the killing of innocent inhab-
itants for the purposes of revonre or the
satisfaction ef a lust to kill. The
25 £e« ritone at 352-3»
^^ The H^stares Case ( United States v. Ust et fil ) . Trials









*. XVl .iiAi >,« • • r-«»
destruction •f property t« b« lawful must
b« liRreratively de^feRd<?d by th« nectSi'ltitts
•f war* Tftstructi^n as an end in itself
18 a vi0lr<ti»n »f int«mfttl<>n«l l«w.
This has, In effect, be*n rest^tec* in tbe I^v/ <gf Kav»l
27
lfitrfcr» in th«s follovinc lfinfij£iSe: '
Th* principl* «f siilitary necessity permit*
It b«llir«r«nt t» firply •nly the d^fT^e and
kind •f rfti^&terd f«rc«, n»t ©therwise pr«*
hiblt«d by th« laws •f war, r«ouir«d f»r
partial •r complete subejisiion ©f the ©nasiy
vith the least possible exp«>nditure ef time,
life, and physical r«8<»urce8«
Frwa tiie f«rttg«ing it e^n be detenslned th«!t a bJilsnes
auot be refiched between the dictates sf humanity sand th«
exercise sf the doctrine of necessity »nd th«t the pr? cticsl
aspects 9f m«dem vf«rf«r« d# nst limit « centinued c©nsider-









Thft Isfue® Which Have Bee a:^g»d Relative t^ Functional
The <!«irel»pai«iit ftf th« 8ub««rin« as a weapon h©» |fiv«a
rise te certain Is^uea relative t« the m&nner in which it fea«
be«ri •mpleyed, er ra&y he esfnpleyed^ in wartime* In erder t«
fully appreciate the aignifieance ©f these issues it is
necess&ry ts examine them b@th frea the standpoint ef histsr->
leal derivation and existing 8ul»aariiie doctrine •
1. Ri?fht te Destray
Csnerally, all cs^ibatant nsval units of the enemy, includ*
Ing auxiliary service and supply vessels, may be sunk mn
sl^t without preliralnary warning »r d«eand fsr surrender*
Ksresver, the right sf a belliferent te sink the sserch^nt
vessels sf the enemy, under certain canfUltiens, is rec#|rnlsed
by intematianal law and practice,**^ altheugh there are cer-
tain classes ef vessels which aT9 exeaipt fr«!»a capture, and ef
10
eeurse, destruction,'^ The law regarding destruction of neutzsl
vsssols is fflore stringent, and trsdltlonslly they were rogaiMli
11
ss iBUsune from attack •'^
28 Stone at 5^5
•
^^ l.J. Garner^ Internatioi^ Law k The VJorld War 362 (195?0)
/Sereinaftor cited as Cameyv.
^ Hi^:ue Convention kI, 19C7, listed these as vessels employ-
od in religious, scientific or philanthropic aisj^ions, as
well ®5 cosBtal fishing vessels and sail packets.
31 CoUabos St 791.
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Th« pr«««iit rules which g»v«ra the e^niuct ®f wtr v*»««l«
in th«lr belllftrcnt activities against Bi«rch«tnt v«as«ls ©»n
b« traced t© the concept ©f « captured v««««X «8 s prizt, t©
b« takon int«et if p*0sibl«» and f b« delivered t® th«
••vcrei^ ©f th« cfipturing vessel • The prlae »«d its eargp
••uld then be disposed sf , enrichini: b^sth the treasury and
tbs capturing crew.^^
The esncept ef prise nust be c«Rsider«»d in its relatisn
t« the belligerent ri^t ef visit and search. This is «
ril^t sf ancient application and is described in treaties
dating back ts the fifts<»ntfe century. -^^ It «ay be dssertbed
as the ri#it ef a belligerent warship te visit any saerchant
vsssel encountered up^n the hl^h seas te ascertain if the em^
includes military ^sds destined fer delivery te the enesiy*^^
EasMy vessels ss visited are, ef course, captured, and if fer
SSAS reasea they eannet be taken inte pert as prises, are
destroyed* Lei^tiaate reasens fer destructien include unse**
werthiness ef the prl2:e, lack ef a prise crew, stress ef
weather, lasilnent danger ef recapture, er serieus danger te
the success ef naval epfrratiens*^* the extenslen ef the riif^t
te visit and search neutral vessels stisj^med frtm a leprical
desire en the part ef belligerents te prevent %h^ shippini; ef
3^^See II A.B. Keith, >lie»te^s International Law 315-35 (1944)
ferelaafter cited as V*heaten7
Celembes at 753
•
34 Brittia at 5%'atsen at 145.
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war e««d8 t« an enemy by any means •'^ However, the d«s->
tnsctian mt a neutral vessel feund te contsin eentrab&nd was
eust«!!i4irily permitted enly under extraordinary cenditlens.^'
There h»ve been s»v«»ral efferts In the past te ebtain
general Intematienal apreecient en the rules ef aaval warfare
in this aiT«9im The Hague Cenventien VI ef 1907, respecting
the status ef ai#rchant vesnels at the outbreak ef hestilities^
autherised the destruction ef merchant vessels ef the enemy,
subject te c^i8pi?»n8a len, when such vessels were fewid en the
high seas, but were Ignerant ef the f«ct that hestllltifts had
ftSMseneed.^^ The Beclaratien ef h&M<^n ef 1909 centiilaed
prevlstens fer the destructien ef neutral prises If the
capturln/?; warship was In seme way «Rdanrer«d, er If taking
the neutrsil vessel inte pert would have «ndanrer«d the success
ef the warship's laissien,-'^ It sheuld be neted that these
rules were bein^ fertaulated in a tt»e fraite i^lch centemplatsd
a eeismerce destroyer as a heavily amed surface vessel and
net the then fledf.linf submarine*
With the enset ef "i^erld V*ar I, hewever, the submarine
beesae a positive fscter in the field ef marltine warfare*
One ef the first and aere puinful Intreduetiens t© this new
erder occurred ea 7 May, 1915, '*<hen The Lualtanle . an unamed
British paseesfer liner, was torpedoed by a Gerasn U->beat
yo See Celeabes at 754.
22 Stone at 5' 5-d.
55 Article 3.
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without T>ri»r warning and sank with e 1*8S <if •ver elevwi
hundred lives .^
Further indication •f th« capability •f this ii«v weapon
was de««nstrated by th« cruise ef the German sulwsarlne, 0«53 «
This leae U-beiat creased the Atlantic in the stssner sf 1916
and entered the barber at Kevrr^rt, Rhode Island, where its
•nmulrii paid courtesy calls en still neutral AmerlcaB naval
officers* Thereafter, the submarine took position near the
Hantucket li/^btsbip s^nd proceeded to sink flire sgercbant
vessels* v'ome of these sinkings were accomplished in the
presence of Aaoriean destroyers and in one instance m dos*
tr'^yer ctaplied with a polite request to stove so that a ship
oould be torpedoed.^
^8 a result of the adverse intematiensl rfsction follow-
ing the sinking of The I^usitania * »n4 other Bimilsr incidents
,
the Geraan navy for a tine abandoned the U-boat campaign
•gainst merchant vessels. Howevor, on 1 Fobrusiry, 1917,
tbo Kaiser ordered unrestricted sub»arine warfare on all
shipping, thereby directing a wholesale destruction of sur-
face vessels, without consideration of customary prise law,
which continued until the end of the war,^^ Tho Qer»«n SLTga^"
onts supporting unrestricted warf ro included claims that
•ubttarines had no rooa to take personnel from the destroyed
^^' ColoBbos at 7^9.
41 Admiral Scheer, Geraiany's High Fleet In the V/orld War 264-7
U934).
42 M- *^ 232-3.










Te»!»«l8 •n b«iircl| &n<S^ in additian eauld n«t spare mmt
th« »salX m2bB£rlne cr^-ws t» act as prl2« cr^ws,^^
By th« end e»f W«rld War I It had b«e«iD9 »bvl»ue tbat
•p«elal consideration df th« role of th<i subnarliio in werfcre
if«» roquir«d. The Kaehln^ton Nav«l Conference of 1922 provided
A forusi for tlsis consid«r*ti©n, Tho rosulting treaty stip-
ulated that merchant vessela should be requested to sub^sit
to visit and search prior to any seiauro, that merchant ship®
eould not bo attackod except in ease of failure to subftlt to
visit und search or refusal to f^r^e^i^d &9 directed aftor
soiziure, ^nd eould not be doatroyod imtll the crew and psssen-
gors had boon placed in safety.^^ In addition, sijpatoriee to
tlio tr'^aty were asked to ai^to that subraarinos sjust coafoiw
4.6
to those rules or perait merchant vossels to pass tmhamod*
Tiolstions of the rules vere to be declared as piracy.
This effort was followed by the Naval Treaty of 1930
between Great Britain, the United States, Jst^Bn^ France, »nd
Italy, although the latter did not retify the e^r^etaent.
Fart IV, Article 22 of this treaty provided?
(a) In their action with r9.^ur6 to
merchsnt ships, eubsa&rines must oenfom
to the rules of International Law to
which suface ships »r9 subject,
(b) In particul&r, except in the case
of persistent refusal to stop on being
duly su-:.cioned, or of active resistsnce
44 C«m«r at 377-^1.
45 Wheaton at 316-7.
46 stone at 5^1-2* The treaty was ratified by the United S'tates,
the British Inspire, Italy, and C&p»n but never c&me int«» force














te visit sknd twareli, fi wisrship,wfe*ther
6urfse« vess«»l ©r «ubaarin«, »ay ii^t
sink ©r r«nd«r inc^pablf? mt ii«vlf:®ti»ii
« mer<?k&iit v«8sel without bsyinfr first
placed pasfi«»g«r«, cr«»v^ ftnd ship's papier*
in a pl&c# «f s«f»ty, fmr tl^i® purp«se
th© ship's boats are ii«t refa^-diei a® a
place ©f ©afaty tt!il««s tMe s«f«l^ af tfee
p«ssenf*rs arjd er^^ ia isssure^, in th«
exiatinf, Sf?« and v^^^ther eanditians, by
th« prisxlmlty ®f lasd, ar iB the f?r*»'®eHca
»f anath^r vessel whieh is in a pasitian
t© tskf» tb«« an baard.
Artiel® 23 af tM9 treaty s^tipulatad tfest th«» pravi sians
(Artid a 22) re^iardinf; aubmsrines sh#uld i*a«ala 1r farca




etad verbatiM Inta tha t®«idaa Prat#eaX af 936, ta wteiete
4?* statas h&4 hee^me sifji«t#ri«B by 1939
•
Warld War II bej^an th«ref»r«, with naar tatat afre«m«mt
intam«»ti^^nally as ta tfee mttfeads wfciefe submitriiias ajii^t
lagitimataly aaiplay afainat merchant vassels. It ca«« as a
ruda sfeaek whan an th® fir^^t 4tkf 9t tha war a Oarajaii swb-
aari»a tarped@«di tbe Britiafe p%Bti^ng,eT iiR«?r AlklSM»
signal lini?- th«r«by a. raturs t« tiit days af usir»strict«dl
uadarsaa warfsra. Cerasa subiaarinta cantinuedi ta attaek laar-
aliant ves «•!», bath balliferent aisd neutral, in viaXatiaa af
custamary intemstl^snal l^\s ^.n4 tke lmn6@n Pr®t®c#l»*
This activity was nat, baw^svar, liait<»^ ta tb« Axis
pawars* Dti 7 TnicaiRbar 1941, th<? United States Chi^-f mf Haval
^7 British Tr#*aty Sarits, ia, 29 U936) •
4o Celaabaa «it 493*4
•
49 s#a '"•war 49^-3, 542 (I.B. Fattar h C.¥, Kibitz ad* 106C),













Oper*tti«n8 •rd«r«d unrestricted subsiArlne warfsr^ afalnst the
J«pan«8* P»pirft.^ Great Britain al8# adapted the practic© •f
Binkinj!^ without warning all Kterchsnt vessels (li©c«v^red In
ctrtAin specified war j^anss.-'*
Fallawing i^/arld /ar II, the various war erimes tribunal*
had aecaElan ta cansider several ca^es invalviri;^ eubmarina
activity* The mast aeatiingf^il of tfees^ wa« the trial af
Adftiral Karl Daenlts, i4ia directed the German U-baat eampaiiJR
during the w«r* A<bRlral iDaanit?. i^aa Indicted an twa catmts,
alleging (1) cri®«s aj^alast the peaea, and (?) war criaeg."
The foraar count Invalved the prepsratlan and the waiting af
aggreaive war and will not be canaidered hare. The aecand
caunt invalved the waring af unrestricted submarine warfare
in via}»tien mT the 1936 Frotoeal and was subdivided inta
three p^rta*
The first af th«^se ch^^rged Daenltz with waging unn!»»trlct-
•d warfare arainat amed British merchant vessels. Tha
Tribunal, in finding teenitz net guilty af thia charjre,
raaaaned that since the British had armed their rserchant ships
at thf baf;lnning (»f th<* war, «nd had directed thessj t« att&ek
submarines, the i^raed merehantttan %tf<^re not entitled t» tha
wfiming pravisiens af the pratacal**^
The sacand allefatl^^n concerned the declsrini: •T cert:alii
•p#rational sanes in which all neutral merchant vessels wera
51 Sea Power 796 (F,B. Patter & C.Vs. K'imlts ed. I960),
52 Sts^ne at 597
53 International^Kllltary Tribunal,Trials of Major War
Crisilnaia, Vol. 5.) II, 556«7 (1943)1
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sunk vdth«ut w/*minr,« This fecti^n w»© held t# be a vi©lati©ij
•f the previsions ^f the pr*t®c»l»"^^
The finel charf.e inv«lved tVs ren«»r©l failure ©f C«nuui
sitbm&rine c»m®8nd*rs t» rescue th«ir victims f«ll??wing the
destruction sf ships. This also was declared ts be a vlolstisR
•f the prstecel,^ and will b« discussed hereinafter in Msre
d«t»iX.
The reaarksble part •f this entire pr<»ceedinf was the
failure ef the Tribunal te assess the sentence awarded te
Aisiral Deenits en the basis ef the findings af ^lilty te
vielatians ef the pretocel. The Judgment in this respect
reads: ^'
In view ef all the facts j^r^ved und in
particular ef an erder ef the British
Admiralty announced f>n t P.&y 1940^ accerd-
inf te which all vessels should be sunk
en sifht in the Ska.rerrak, and the snswers
te interregateries by Admiral Hiaitz
statin?: that unrestricted sut^iarine war-
fare was carried en in the Pacific Ocean
by the United States frea the first day
that natien entered the war, the sentence
ef Deenitz is net asEessed en the rreund
ef his breaches ef the interna tienal lav
•f submarine varfare.
In this then, the If^test auth<^rit£ilve treatment ef
iatcrnatienal lav^ respecting sub^i^rine warfare, ne punishment
was A\i»r49d f9r preven brestches ef the law.
The present United States pesitien, as reflected in the
Law ef Naval varfare . is stated as fellews:
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^(Rny sercbant vessels may b« att&eked and
d«!f8tr«»y<»)d, ©ither vdth er wltheut prier
wdmlng, in &ny sf th« fsllewin^ circumstancss:
!• AetiYely reslstinf: Tlsit and search er
cay^ture.
2* itefusinjT t« stop upea b«*in^ duly summeaed.
3. ^>ailing under cenvay ©f «»neftjy warships er
•nemy military aircraft
•
4* If armed, end there is reason te believe
that such armament has been used sr is
intended fsr use, effensively a.ffainst an
oneay,
5« If inoart^rated Ints, er assisting in any
way, the intelligence a^stea •f an enemy's
armed ferces.
6« If acting in any capacity as » naval ar
military auxiliary ta an eneisy's trmed
farces.
As ref^ards neutral vessels ^ the sa»:e publicatien statas
in part:^^
Alth#u|!;h tb^ destruction ©f a neutral prisie
is net sbselutely ferbidden, it invelve© a
«uch saere serieus respenalbility than the
destructien ef an en^ty prize. A capturing
•fficer, therefore sheuld never ^rder such
destructien witheut bein^i^ entirely satisfiad
that the military r«*^sens therefer justify
it, i.e., under circumstances such that m
prize can neither be sent in, ner in If^is
•pinion, released.
It is ebvieus that medem intematienal practice, and
decisien, permits the destructien ef enemy vessels and^in
Halted situ^tiens, neutral vess*'ls, ^ile the everall
question ef the viability of the traditional rules reif^arding
submarine warfare will be considered at lenf;th hereafter, the
judgaent at Hurersberg, and the practices which preceeded it,









indicates that tht Tribunal beli#v*d that it wse arplyiag tte«
existing lav t* E««nit2*s case, it is »t lesst srinisble that
tfee ®ld rules n# l«iigisr «xist«d in vi»?v/ ©f c«ntinu«d state
prsctic®, and that in fact the Tribunal wii« relnstitutinr the
eM riiles rather than rtaffirming tbtm,
>"r»® th# fereg^ing it may b« ebEftrv^d tbst the belli|f:erent
right t* destroy the merchftnt vessels ef «ny entmVf er ef
neutrals. Is under certain circv^??!st«ncf'Si, accft-fted: if net een»
deaed» Such actien necessarily pl«c«ss in p«ril the livee «f
the cr«w and passengers ef tlte destr^y^^d irej?sel» It i« clear
that there la en eblig^ti^tn imf-esed by custei^ry Intem&tienal
lav requiring thf^ belligerent t© preside tT the safety ef the
passengers and crew #f the destroyed vessel.
International agre«^<?nt® en iBs.ritiiae wsrf^sre have ireneral*
ly recegnizedi this principle, Article 3 »f the Ha^e C«nventi®n
VI ef 1907t previously discussed, conditi#ned th# rifht te
deatrey merehaint vessels ef the eaeay, at tfe® eutbresk »f
iMatilitiea, upen r>revlsien b^ing made fer the s*.fety «f the
persens en beard aa well as fer the preeervatien ef the ship's
par>er8« In addltien, the ^eclaratien ef Lendon ef 1909, after
previdinjK: fer the destructlen ef neutral vessels in certain
clrcuisstances,^^ declared that sll ptrsens ®n beard th* vessel
62
«uat be placed in safety prler te its de®tructien.
}0 G&mer kt 370
>1 Od» feit, supra, n* 39.
>2 Article 50.
It tl'-











7h« sinking ®f The ^urltanla . and ©th«r similar sets
curjng v?®rld teii.r I Indicated & di^r^^ar^ #f t'ris principl*.
Thi»r*«fter, the parties ti» tb© Washington J^aval C«nf«r«»nce
of 1922 InsfTted & rr@vl6l«»n r«quirinr thf* cr*^w Stnd n^gsn^n-
irer© e-f smercbent vtee^ls t*'^ be placfd In safety pri©r t»
d«8tr«yinf: th# vessel, -^^ A similar prevision w«s ins«»rt«d
in Article 22 of th«^ V.sivsl Treaty ••f 1930 which, ^,f course,
was then inc«rp®rsted int-? th.e 1936 toridan rrs^tsc^l.
As in '^orld War I, the practices sf W«rld M&r II did
net c«?rrjpiy wit^ thi*s« F-t an<-?ards. TV-up, t' * ^'nr»mh^rf Tri-
bunal, in c«sia«ntlng ^m tb«?. failur* i>f v^eni.i>a''s Gensan
eubmisrinffa t-s reseue t^ei^ sbipwr«J6kffid victiae, stated. ^
Tlif* !?vid«nct further pJi^wc th«t the r^'seu* pro-
visions were n?it earrit*d ;-mt and that th« ds-
f«nd«nt »rd»red th>tt t?'#y n«t b** carried nut*
Th<^ sri^j^ent of the? d«*f«ns« is th&t the security
#f thff s!ubm»rin^ is, »« tl « firr't rul« &f the
s«e, p«ra.'a*^uint t© rescu?? &nd thi*t th«^ dev?»l9pT^f;nt
»f aircraft made rescue iiip«ssible» Tlis *aay
b^ s--! . hut tb« Tr^tjacol ie ^e^xpMcit. If the
e«fr??attd#!!r earm^t rescu*, tf?©n (irid*r ite t«r:^a
he csnnigt sink a mftrchant veSK«l and s' ould al-
low It t& "pMBS har®l!!*8S l5«f5*re his p€*risC9r«#
7h«s« ®rd<?rs, then, pr®v# feenitz is sruilty »f
a vialati^n ©f th« prstf^cel,
Ftnrther c>^nK.id«rstiQn to the pli#rht «f survivors «t
se« was .rrentft^ by the 1949 C«B«va C:;>nv<»fvti«n»^^ tb«
^%%^Sit9n ^t 316-7.
^^Ini ©rnatiaaal *«ilitary Tribunal, Trial "?/' ?'4aJor I'ar
Cri-inaU, Val. XXII i;«59 (194^).
^5ceneva Csnvfrnti^n for th« A^nellsrati^n <»f t!e Condition
®f th« W«>\mded, Sick «nd SMpwr^ck^d i^embtrs «f Ariaotf
F«rc«8 et Sea ^f Au^ru^t 12, 1949»
-?5-

sea wl»» ar« w unded, 25lck» ®r 8?--ip%*r?^ck<*d;^'-^ requires that
wounded, sick and shipwrecked bellif«r«nts wh® are captured
shall br treated «t? rris:)ners: ??f war,^7 end rrf:>vides that
After frscT- battl??, parti!*^ t- tr;i» c .nf '; ict si all sf»*rch
f^r and call set w und*d, sick and ishipwrecked per«^ftn«l
«rid Insure t' eir safety. ^^
Alth«?uj^h it ic srf-uffibie th^t lntarn6<ti*nal prsctic«
in th^ twQ fe^rld Wars, and th« failure #f tfe« ?lur«fBb#rg
Tribunal tJ runlsh <>«©nlt2 far vl.«slati^n» >%T th*» r^scufi
pravlsi&ns ^f tre 1936 Frat&cal, have ri«f;at«d any cjuty to-
wards !»urviv-*rs, it 1^ cl«&r th*t tMs husaanitarian concept
was, St f-'* l^^^ajit, r^viv^d b'- the si.rf»£t.;>ri*'.s t-i?* th* 1%Q
c-«vef.tl«n.
B, B«*fiibardmfnt
Thf* sffcond -aajdr l»»u« t«> fo* consid«r«d is ttt* r*!*' «5f
thff pubraerin<? in naval b*jmba rdraent» V:"il# th« r^l** <^f t^'#
siibtn&rinft in tie past h&s n<;&t n»lably included b M-nberd^i^^nt
,
th* n^itur* ef tr-«* vreap^ne r-'-utln«ly carritsd by siany m^d^rn
BubEi&rin*'B constitute tM;- 2 v«>ry timely i6su««
!• Lftritifli&t» Tarr^te






has always been €:m«id<!frf«<^ « l«*fltl-Tat.8 act ^^f n^v^l vi?sr-
f«r««^9 The status of iinfprtifi«<3 arear. has n*L oean »«
wtll defined, altl cui^b historical pr»c#«3^nt for the d«»-
tructl»n ®f ^V't*n &na. uRd«»f«nded cl.r/t«-s lar b»*r sravm.^O
Hajfue Cii^nvcntian iX ©f 190? d^velar^d certain pn^vi-
•i»ns r^sp^ctinff. naval b^abar^-sent whl«h h«v« b««n described
ftft '*cl«srly quitff a?^bif:ui»a?-- and In&^equs^* f«)r «rv u?'.«ful
purp»»«*\'^ Article 1 ^f trls c :r5ven,tii»n pr^Mblt«d th«
naval b-?-abard?n^nt vf imde.f«nd«d p»rt» and citi#8, but
failed r -^ '•:*<*^r^« t^^ tersj "undef«nd(f>d**. It 'Hd rt?t«,
hewevwr, t'r«t th« pr#s-8«nc« ©f -mln©* In a harbor v.'^?^ insuf*
ficicat reason t« b'-^-sibard a port. Article 2 except- ®cl fr«Ma
the pr«fcibiti»nR ^.f 'rticl^' 1, "military w^rkp, rsilitsry
ar n«vai «8i.8blir>h??»(Rnts, a9pmt^ t:f arnis ar vv*sr :?iaterlal,
warkahaps mr plants wMcb c-*ul^ b« utlH^ftd f®r the fi^ads
af a haptil* ^i --«• -,r amy", and permits thair c;»?>t ructl»n
if the lacs*]. .ils-ce fail?^ ts da »® ©fter bsvlnf b«»en
fiven nstlce. <>th«r e,rticlfp fr©vid#d f^-r the aparinf 9f
churchea, haspitslf*, sci^Titlfic end historical buildinga,
and like e'^lflces.
V-tiile n»val b'-rsberd.'^ent was Cf>m9i«>nplace flurlng Wsrld









•»r1.n«« played a «.ft,j©r pmrt in thin activity » fhvfrm i\r^ ».
f<»v/ firs- tT^^d r«r0rts !sT U-bcstS hmibs^rr^'rr thfi Brlt.tsb
A chr»R»I<»<ry of United Ttate* siitearin«^ #t>«rations In th«
Pacific during. World vr^r TT lli?t» .imlv 13 nslasli^nK r^^'^rt-
iRf: j^ubrsarin* b»mbsrd-?r'nt»'^-^' This wsf^ 1"". a Isrr« rs.rt
attributable t® tb«ir litnit<%d ar^»JS(*nt and tfc#ir t>r«-«*mptl.'sn
f»r ^rft suitable missions,
Thit prestnt l'Jiit«»d ^tuti^r p^stti^n r^^n-ftct.?* t^# tra-
ditional view:'^^
Tl:'s tens bambar^nent ms imed br-©ln lnclu^«a b*tb
c*!V«.l «nd aerial bsBtbardrnfnt. T^'ls sfCtl'^R ia
n®t c^nc^rfi^d id.th t^-* l^^^al M-fitatl^ns an Isnd
b^5ibar-''''--^"'''t by land farce©*
a. ;-,. ..;:TI'')lt -"?? CITIEJ?* the ^mntm s!e0tn3,cti^n
af citi<»s, town®, 3»r irl.lia^'i^e, ar any devastation
ri*t ju6?tifif-d. by military n€ce'«»ity «r«» pr«tV.lbited,
b. flOI«COHB/^T.*WTS, Bellif^r^Rts fer« f«rbid<^.»n t*»
«a;<» n^ncMibatantft ibf tar*-et sf ilr-uct attack in
th« f«rM «f b-««abard'r?ftnt , sue? b 'dbardM*r;t bf/'ng
unrelated tc? a .^lltsrv objective, f4?>/e>r»r, the
'•^ «>f n*Gcombatanta ii^ th* vicinity ?:»f mili-
t..-; , ..-.j«ctiv«s d«es nst r«nd«r fucK «bjf»ctiv*«
l.T.muiie from b'^mbardsstnt f®r tht reas-'tit that it 1»
l'vf<^ESible t/i; ba^bard tKam wit' i^ut c»us.1?>f Ir^'^M r^'Ci
in'ury t<?' tb« livae and property #f nanc#£ibst4»rts#
In «tt«apting t© batsbard a fslUtary s>bjffctiv«,
eam-ii^* tre nai rs'sp^nsibl* far ir»cic®nt3il
^amef? ,.© t> abjeete in t^ (*• vicinity v''tc> -.jr*
n®t •:^ilitary ©bj<*ctlv«e»
'73f;«>sc«»«, Unit.*«i Stataa Sybf^ar-n* ^'"^^«rat!^n» T" ''*«»rl<!
^
Var II 5C5-22 {1Q49).
7%feiral vvarfara Pfera. 620-21.
.2^-
"sew
j:^rp«s« «f terrorising the clvllii.R r?«pu-
lati»n is prohibited.'
blddrn t;? bambftrd a city <&r t<swn th&t Is
un<^^feiid«d and thf^t 1« ©prr tfj ifnrd«(ai&t«
entry b? ©wn «r iilll#d f©rc«©.
Fr*vlsi*n l8« nl^^ mi^4^ fmr th# r^sp^ct^nf^ t»f rn«?ifflcal
•«tabll©h?s#nts «»d units, as well as byllcilfiifs d«v»ted %&
r«llri®u8, «rti©tlc ©r ch&ritabl* r^r?"CfS«»J5, an?^ hlrt^rical
«#»um«nts* /^
TV<» cus^t -^'Tiary l«v r«»sr'f'Ctinr Bsval b-sr^hardtTsent ytst&
c^ncern^d with th? r.i5ti$n sf c-a^i^ts.! ,*r#,ag, Thf» 190? H&^^^u*
pr«Yl£l-ins were cl«-ftrl>' dftsign^cH w1tb<aut t^«yf>.t »f th«*
l«n£ rsnriP «ub8tsrin#» -alssil^ «'5.i t>':^ pr*s#r5t rt;i«!? €-?>ntdin#«<J
In tAte or ??AVAL ^AR-^AictK »r*- tss«nti*lly a rej^t^i <••-,
th#s<» <*airll«r rul««, Tht practical pr^bl«^i5 in «tt#i?5ptlng
t» ll^:lt t?-^ tsrfft ar«» ©f e raiesil* ©nis^d wlt^- a p'ycX^ar
ws?rhftS'- and fi r#d inlar^d fr*s»!» « ^Ift-tsnc* »f hundreds, ©r
tV4tts«nde sf ailaj* appear insur?;tuntsbl<*. I"©w#v*»r > t!^«
i«bi,Ht'-- ^f t:'*>«^ rul«» wlV ^*-- diactssred h*?rein»rtfr,
2. i>vt,v tt« W4^yT|.
Th« ®blif»tl«n t'3 wsirn th« iahsbltsnts ^f • tarrtt
8r»a pri»r t'» b!5fib«rd"««nt v/^uld tpp«er ts^ b« a 1®.' icel ap-
plication «f th'ft cu»tt:*?fiary distinction b«tw*en c-'>sabfttant«
arid n^n-c«3ibatanta«





IT Uv« ?nllit»:ry situstl^n pt^rsslts, th-m ©#»§«;&« d#r
»f th« attack jnf: n*val f»re#, b«fer# c^aass?- .•?:
This appartT^tlf i-" & e^rallarv t^^ ^-'rticl* 27 *r t,h« r«Ktt-
Tht «fficer In c«3^m:":a!5d -sf sii ^ -nr f«ni«
In c»s«^ 3ff »65?»ult, d'Ss fill in '"ts^ j?««jfer ti?> warn
*ss«uite, «>n th« «i!8U5spti%n tKst an s&SBult in th« inst«r«
®f & surprise «it«ick will be m«rt aucG«ps^fial wltl*''*!!^ wa,rp-
Tfe.« tw® »«ri^ Wr» 40 'n^t furnish siueh data «©. %f^iiuh
t.» base « 1ud|^#nt &e t# the practice -tf Kubif*«rln«^» ia
. ',he vuln«r«billi3f •£ tb« submiirin* t« r»tall«t»r7 «t«-
tsc-: after w»rsing| tubsESTir^i* e-^8*i?:«nd«r« alaaant URiv«rffl*.Ily
dct«r^'iln«d t>.*t tb« ailii-ary =t5*R did w«it permit
vr&rninj? pri®r t» b#fflb6nl'*«ut«
T^.*» l>»y Of ??«vl >^'arfgre e#nt«ltis s clsure »l^il«r ta




^r« « ailitary situatian p#r®lt©| «»am®iii»r«
sfc*uldl make tvery atteapt ta five pri^r us^rnin-g
th« Givillan p«pul4tti«n in cltse pr®.xi!?iitv %rf11
ii«v« an •pp«rtunity t# seek ssftty,
A llt«r«l «ir»luati»a •f %h* rul«s, iHitl; pa ft and pr#s«iit,
ewip«l» th« e#RCIu8l#ii tlf^at tfe« wsraiiif r#i|«ir«!»«»t In, in
49e\men%»ry f»f« at l««LStg &pplie«ble to ^l»sil«»6 flr«^ frwa
8ubB«ri»«8. 7k« liwiftRlt.$rlim prlis€lpl«8 l^adiaf t9 t^is
r«atrictl»n ©n c«i?nr«ntl«ii«l iitaval b«aibar^^«f}.t »pptar «v«a
s»re pressinf. ^glk%n «ppli€4 %» mmrm «^v^ne«d w«ap«nry# Tl4#
pr»bl#ti af aiilitary practicality r«aa«ii3» t« b« r«s«lv«<i» fe#w-
C. Blockade
C)a« tf th« Itfltiaat* »«am« wMeli ^ b«lllg®r«i3t ®ay
\itiXi%t t* iat«rdlct an «fi«ay*# e«mm®rc« Is %h% imp^&itimn of
ft bX»ek&i«. Tr«^itlft]|iiXljri a bt#ek«d« has b#«R Smfinmi «« ait
fi.et •f w«r carri«d #iit by tlie wartbipa 9f «i b«llig#r«Rt aii<i
^e»ifn«^ %m prevent «©e#ss t«, «r ^eparturt f3M»», a d«t»il«<i
portion f tk« #n«iay*« etast by vessels »!' «iiy ii«ti«ii» mtmstj
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•r a«utr«l. A t«r« n^lcto inart b« di«tinquisli«4 frea bl«sk«i«
as u»«4 lMr«in is tls« ©©•c«lltd "^psi^ific bl»eka^#** whlet^ is
«ipX«y«d 9!tly in p«&ce tiat t^ e»@rc® tlt« bl«»ckttd«4 4it&t« t«
e«af91191 t9 S9ffic d^sirti «tti «r e»aip9rt itself in aeesr^snce
with tr-^aty 9blir&tl9n8, ' Recent wartime practice has ^iven
77 s«« ^vfeftstoE at 5 25*6 •






ric'?* t9 pr«blfjRs c»nc«r^lnf th* type •f b«lXi?'#r«'nt »ctl*ii
t^8t May lefitlRWitffl V b« trrss'd « blacka^se, ai""--' tfe* r«X»
that the £ub?«srin« wiy play ^n enf®rcinf bls-cksd^^s.
{«} ShTt Fanre . >-lst0ric»Ily th« concept t-f & bl<fck-
«4« eat eg fr»m 15^4 wJ'-ftn th# Dutc) ietlur^^ » bl»eks<l# *f sll
Fl«"si8h p«rt8 «ccuri*^^ by Scar^iffh c&nqu«r€rs« '^ Tfls f^arly
bX»ck«'> was prinifcrily c^ncernsd with prt.Tent'"rtg- w«r syp-rli«»
•r contraband fr«m falling; int& fpanis^ hands, ''#w«ir«r> In
163c the Butc'^ Issued a r-reclasiatlsn denying thf SpanifK ac-
cess t« aiiv 6®rt »f «c««n c^^aerce in t^# j?r«a, «n<j? ^«cl*rlRg
that n«utrsl s^'lpjs wsulci be c nfif?cate<^ if captured atte'^ipt-
inut ta entffr 9r leave t?-«? Ppardsb p«riJ? in Flim^^ers,'"'^"
61«cki>'dee v^^r-* th«'re&fter lisec? vdth varyinfr derrees -^jf success
by •there, including tb# English ®raiRf:t *5aT-«l««n*8 F'r»nce,
the H»rtK durln^r the Civil '^ar, and in «tber iiaj«r stn^ Kjinsr
c«nf ilcts,^'^
A custestary bleckaee, in ^r^ler t» be Ij^^ally blnd-'ng,
Bust be s\ipp»rted ari enforced by a ©yfficlent nusiber ©f
vessels t--^ cut «ff «ne;Tiy csmsunicati^ns «r«' t« affarc' a risk
•f capture t« sM.ps attetnptini; t'S pae'F- tlr^ufh, ®r, &f sta^e^
in Article 3 §f the 1?^56 Declaration «f faris, *'Bl»ck*.r?eE,
in «-rder tc- be binding au.vt b*» effective, thfet is t - eay,
aaintaine^ by a f»rce sufficient really t*'- prevent access t»
79"*beaten at 5?6.
gCG«l»iab»8 »t 71 5
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thp clTBirfe •.^ th* *n*my," ?-"»v«v»*r, s blockade r«^.T.»ir.B in
f©rc* fsr £!' l:.-p* 55 t^.ft C3frsd;'ti -ns .necessary f^r it^ sfit.&b-
lis! -.^ant rxiet &rM is R»t nn4t4 by s niii««nt«ry 3nt«»rr\ipti3»n
Th* Lecl»rati»n »r u«nd«n «f 1909, ulthauffe unr»tifit?<i,
It adapted t) *^ ^'"f i»ct^v«n<»fis r.**qulr#-:«nt 'ij'f t\ m I>clffirat1.a!n
•f Pari?, ^ ane aeded thst th*» qu^'stidn #f f»ffectiven«ss Is
n« *f fact t''^- b*» v^^ter?ain<»«l by t>* e^^urts. * It necl«r«<
that sn blockade was n»t t*n?*3n&t^d by th« withdrawal »f
bl«cksdir:r f©rc»f? dy* t? inclwrsfnt vf*fetbi»r, - It r<»qi3lr*ii
thst a bl^ckad* b<t apfll^d iapartislly t^ tb» i»hlpf5 of sll
nations, ^ »ft«*r d«cl«rsti®»n »f bl«cksdft, and appropriate
notice. " Th* «J«cl« ration was requi rf'd t« be ssac?* by th«
bl«ck5(din.)? p©w«»r, «r by naval authority actinf In tM nsis*
»f th^* r-«wv?r, And mvi&t s<»t fart^- th« dtt« th« hl«ickad(f b^f-an,
the r^mfrruT^'^ic lijsits, anci » r«H«d tf rrac* In wMc^ n#utrsX
v«s«^1b si^y safely leav^ the iir/ea."''^" M«tlricati»n was requir«»d
t* all af!"fct**«^ neutral powers and t© l«c?^l »ut'^ ^ritlec,^
as the liability
€»f a neutral vesse: t^? captur«* f<^r breach
• f bl»cka^« was c&ntlni^ent en ber actual «r preauu^ptive













* ' «' ?' i ''i
kn^vled^ft tf the bl«ck&de,^ F«wev«r, a bl«ek&de was not
penaitt'jrd f «xtrnd t® neutral ports. ^-^
The f©rp?g©ln£ discussien ef the traditional doctrine and
itfi codifications Is indicative of the customary con- ei5t thet,
in 9ra.€r to be effective, a Itrgo number of sMps are requ: : - '
to maintain station near an enemy* s coast so j^s to prevent
an att#>.Ttrt<»d breech of the blockade at any time. This custom-
ary apiroack is d??f?.nitive of the short rfenfc, or so-called
'•close" blockade.^
^fe) Loflig Range . It was perhaps inevitable th>st the
acivanees in technology of the twentieth century, including
the advent of the submarine and the aircraft, would lead to
the conce-nt ^T the lonr rajigo, or distant, bl»cksi:;e. W@rld
<var I £?sve birth ta this new develorment. Great Brit&in
blocks ded Gertnsn occupied B«»lgiu« with a combination of mines,
aircraft, and surface vessflle,^^ In addition, a British
cruiser scuadr-m operated in the l^orth /tlantic, lOCO eiilos
frora German ports, where it intercepted neutral traffic on
th* r)«rtb*rn sea lanes. ^^ The Eajor 5 «n ovation in this regard,
however, v'^s the decision of the British /reverrer.i^nt to prevent
all coaaodlties from reach ini; or leaving Ceitnany by the




See Brlttin ik Watson at 144.













•a«fty •rii^rt •r d^stin^tl^n t» £i«vlat« t« Britl&k ports whttiHi
tfeft geofts vere cenfiacate^l, ev^n th®ui* n«t t»«itrab^ad*^ "^
&I rT9und8 th«t this '^bluckade'* wsts ill#itsl sine* because »f
the large fcr«A itiTtl-r^d it eciuld n»t b« •ff«?ctlv«3.y eiAlntslfi#4«
fin^ ill ftd^ltlen, it «f*r«*'^'^ in «fjr«et »« « M^ekad© »f
s«titr6l p«rt». Th« British justified tbtir p««lti«n a« b«ln£
a r»t«Ilat«ry 4«psrt\ir« fr«a «acl sting bl«ck$d« 1*%? which wa«
justified b^€«iu»e af th# CNiraian 8Ctl«R In d^clifcriisf tfe«
vsters surrauading thu llKlt«<l Kltt;^d«is t« b« a w&r %*ii«> in
which all sMprinf: sniffet br d«»tr»ye^." Hagardlasa af tb«
jttstificatlan, an^ 4««plt« th* br#«eli with tr«i3iltian» tfeara
is n# daubt tfcat th* British cansidar*^ th«ir ftctian ta h^6
a blackada^^'
.arid tv»r II a^aifi aaw Sritaiu, and franca, put inta
affect slmilfsr requira«#fst» that f#ada ladan in Garsaany, %t
dastined far aa««y dalivary, auat b« discharf^ed in slliad
l^rts* This aetiaii was again d«ai|piat«d ''r«t«Xiatary''«^
The Asa»*rlc&ii aubaiftrliia affensive agalnft <la|»aii in ^rl^
ar II, while lacking aaw* af th« attributes far tr^jiitlaaal
blaekada ainea it was diractad prisiftrlly a^aii^^t «n<^y
ahippinf^ rether than iBCltadln^ n«utrala^ baa an accasiaa
^5 stan« at 500.
^>6 Id, at 5G1-2.
97 n» »^ 500-6. r;a« r^U?ib«e «t 732-5«







f»r sulHRarlR* striken wri«fe w«uld cs»BpX€t*ly inttrdlct
100
afelpplRf f «a^ fr«® tl?** JEnanast ?ferdre. The «ffgctl\iii«»g
Atolral N^murft, ^S^dmcFiBos initially ^lii $r9»t MmS'.f.m tm
•ur thlpping, ami l«t»r combined vith «ir attack, mad* s* 1.p-
ping very scarce."
tlte pr«s*Rt tlnite^ Stat«e p«jiiti*n «« ••t f®rtte in t^e
Lav »f flav&l Warfare , jSill^ws €l»««ly tfe« pr»Ylsi»n8 •f tfe«
1909 Ua4»a 0«cl*rsti«n,'^^'^
Ltepit9 thft p«»iti9si #f s«ft« writers thst submarines
103
«l»a« e»nn0t e«»stltyt« a bl*ek«<lln^ forc«, it ^es B«t
f«ll*w that th«y ar« Inligreatly lnc«r*bl# tf 4#lii£ »•• Aay
9^ T, ^>3ca^, United 5t«tee SubiRJirin« Op^ratl«a» in i^'^rld
5«Ar II 169 (1949). Tli« t«xt r<i«d«, "Ivurinp- the smm«r ft»<l
firutomn df 1942 the P«&rl Hitrbor subEi» rises cli*Bp«<J and tifl?t-
en^id » blecki»de en th^ hewt islanda ef tlapsn ••». I>enf: bffere
th« Japaaese 8trlk«, it hfed b«»n evident t® ^«erlc4.n ns^v*!
le«dfTf* thst « suboAriae bl«ck&d<» ef J«p«» should counter
thi-t nfcLic?n'e plung« into Werld V.ar iX.**
\^ li- "t 174.
^'^'•^ CeieiBbes »t 71^-9 »t«tes, ""Th* c#nditie«» contemplated In
this chapter apply te the *'stabllsht^<»nt *f a blecksde at •#«
carrl<*d eut by surface wen-ef-war. They <ie n»t, ht^yrevnr^
exclude th« c»-eper»tieTi ef submariuffs er aircraft in nAVisl
eperetiene «ltli«ufh neither ef these twe sras c«s»uId|Sin|!:ly
er jointly, be considered, in their prff»«Rt stste ef (tevelep-
senty as c^psble ef enferclng & reftl bleck«de witheut the
assistance ef surfsee warships*** Accerd . in reira^d te Sttb-
narines, fef; II »!•.:. Garri*?r, Tnt-'?rn6ti4?Ral . jw & Th#? v.!*rid
War 317 (T^C) whe sti?t«*fe th^t th* C*^r «in .-^ctien in I^'IS ef
declarinf a war ssese ce'uld net har** been a bl^cksde measure
because, '*.«.n« ad*»quate nav®l forces nd^rf ?tsrti«r.^ '' **f the
ceftste ef England t© mi^km it «*ffective| its mnf^n . bein^








i^ardlnf^^ visit &n^ seftrcb i« yiir«8li»tie iP. vl#w @f ti*«
.y.«d»rr rractic* r#0f/«cti-ry,r t!:«» dftstmctior, c-f ':r.e-rchaTit
Vessels. ^^^ Tfcir #nly v&iici liiait&tisr. &n t.r.« i^-ub^s^arm*
as 8R inctmaent f«»r bl»ck«.^« wimld Appear t^* b« tl^-e II*
sBitatl^nft pl»c#<l #ri subr.aH r.# «nti-c6^»aftrc« werfar^^ In
lave^nti^ri is th« si»th«r ©f r««c«S8ity« Tile r«»v*rs«
cliche- becomes v^r-. applic»fel# t*h«n ««»n»i<l«rifij?^ th« ri^l^
•f the subJi«»rin« in e«ays«re« d«8triiCtlaR. T^;e tttrly sub-
aarlnss irlti th©ir tbla hulXs and puny u^ca itur^^ vere r>#
afctc^ f»r 6uriac« y«rs«1i* i?^ a she»t-^ut, ®r rfiss^jing
•ittt4-:tl^-nt an<-t thnir &!«« afxcJ crev« lisiitati^ns '^td* tf,«
prsctlcfilly imp»s9ibl*» V*irrilnf: a pr*«pectlv«? t&rf,«t
rritr ta ©ttack brtu,^>t th« risV «f r«t*H&tl«i^ frmi other
«B«slt« 8ueia»n*c! by wlrNpl>fts« Consequently, c»n8i<,^eratS#n«
• f *|M»r8-tl©r).«l nec«»»lty required tM« n»w s<*s w«-ap»n t«
«4*pt tactics w>-ic*> '*v*rr*cf« traditional istti ade »f war-
far* •
Sep rt®n«* at 4^«
-37-
. a I'^raafi'iT
> t ^-1 « ir:#'»^
1»
The K»d9rn subaarlne, ftlth#txg):i a larger and ai^re durable
ship tban Its prft«l«ces8«rs, suffers fr«» aaay ef the sane
deflcitncies, fraw th^ stand peint ^f rescue sn4 prize cr*v,
and retaliatian can new ctae by bemb er missile almest
instantaneausly. In view ef tbis, aod etber facters, it is
unlikely tbst the eld rules will ever a ain be fellewed in
practice. Other *a*iters hav* !f>:prffsrec: si.fiilar doubt &s te
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the viability ef the rules in view ef internatienal practice* '^
One coBpelling reasen fer this viewpoint has been the
shift ia eraphasis frem attacks on in enemy's war machines te
attacks en his war petentiel. Ecenert^ic chaes has c»me t©
be recernized as a leritisiate belli|;erent end snd tb« sub-
laarine is recegpized as a sjei^t effective nae«.ns t® ®bt,sln that
. 1C6
end.
Intematienal law can be said te refl 'fct the practice
ef states. The practice has been te abandon the traditienal
rules as represented by tlse 1936 Lenden Fret«cel. In part
this resulted because these rules were in effi»ct a restatewent
•f earlier rules which had deubtful aprlicability te sub-
Biarine warfare, and partially because ef the everwhelatng
necessity in medem eenflict te hasten victery ^y destr»yin#r
^^5 St®ne fct 59^ in dipcussinf Admiral Deenits's unpunished
vielatisns ef the 'ij9nd9n Iretecel states, "It may veil be that
the future ef tlis part ef the law vdll be mere clearly seen
threuf^b the eyes ef the ecenomist and the naval strategist,
than threugh these ef the lavyer er even the aeralist," See
Celembes *it^2^-9.
1-0^ See Stene at 599*602
i
.3a.




fht latest 8uth«rlt«fci'<?e interR.^tl®nfil deci©i#!i in thtn
»r«s was written at Nwre-a^b^rg. TJ^eri? th# Tribunal dtcllntd
t« punish 4^1r8l D#«iiit«, r«c»*rM»Ss^ifig that fcis^ conduct
««rrcsr--^nd«4 witte i!^t*'riis.tl«n^l practice. In riew #,f t>5is
Judg8i*t5t, a»ii th« practices which l«ni It ®iipp©,rt, it may b«
c«iielud«d tliat ulth^ugh th<^ Prtts-Gfel exists ©u paper, it
w«rfar«*
Occasional bresch«s «f ik ml*, a«t it?5»«nting t« practice,
4«i n«t -;s*8ic5? tar rule #b««l«#ceEt» By t^m very natur« mf «««,
it is imqu#sti#ncd that tfee cust^ia^ry rul#8 r«g*rdifif »«¥&!
b^mbs rdm^rrt h&re btan vi«l«t«4 •« ®ec^sl«n during p»«t €»!sfliet»,
havje-vusr, it ^ppesri.- th&t th« cu&tsji^rj rui?;s, pOiriittin^^ as
thay (*•, a rrest d««l «f discretion in the &r«a ©f military
RC'Cffssity, are capable «f b«iR|: fallais?a^ in siadarn conflicts
•f a c©RveRti®nal natisr«« l-awrv«r, in ttie writer's ^pialan,
a far sa»re sf?ri«i;s flav in a rul« af law axlsta, if it la
inapfli cable t« what is eaaaldar^ ta ba a ne^, but p©r®«a«Rt
factual $ituatiaii« Tb« exist a^ca af submarinaa, wbid^ ara
cl»»rly naval vaspala, eapabls af ba^igbarding with laaff raa.f®
jjiiasilas aw»ed with nucl rar ^«T%?'ad« la a fact, a.nd far th«
f©-t»«-*.^.^bl«? futur*, a persQ^aant ana which was nat eaat^splatac?.
whan th^ rules ca»a Inta axleteaee. In a tatal war «BYlran-
raant, adharanca ta the eusta««ry irul?'© wa«l«l ba bii^bly
->9-
"SO*
:,i%J • 4. VseiT
m
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un.lik«lyi and frmx the standp»int »t is^tiasnal self presftrvs-
It Is th<»r#f«r*? canclucec that th«* intrm«;-ti®B«l njl#s
rospectifiij. naval b«Tsb«trd®*nt 8r« prtSf^ntly visbl*"' ''" '"'he
c»nventl»n«l 8ens«, but jr^bablt future trends in wsirfare,
c^abin^-^ with present potential, require a re-evsluatl«n «.€
th«ir ©verall aprllcabilitj^.
Th« concept «f bleckA<i# liss bi?*n « part ©f custe^&ry
ttaritiae law since at l«sBt 15^4. Blv^t»r1 cslTy, ?f»?t <9f th«
period since bae b««n cencem^d vith the shert ran^e, er
"cl^ae" bleckade. Only In the twentieth c entury has t.J^e
cencept ef th? distant bleckade develeped threurh the usare
eJT the great asritime pewerfl. The custeniary law, and
»ubcv*quent eedifica i^ms thereef, wrre cencerned ©nlv with
develer3sa*nt ef intftmationfil Isv/ bs®*<i en tbe trsdlti'^rssl
c;inc*-;-u. The lenr ranfe bif^ciceee, a cnild ef ri»prissl, is
in dere^fttien ef tl>^ traritlenal dectrlne, and its ri?^t te
b»»£r the g'Bn'^ric title, **bl«eksd«", has been cballenired,
prieii^rily bfcause ef failures to rf^r.v*'ct th* c^iv': ^ i. :"- s'^-.-^t^'
nents re^ardini; neutral perts, an<^ because ef alleire*
?ailit«ry Ineffectiirenea«. However, in vi««w a*"" th* :^l«bsl
nature ef siedern Kars, it is likely th£t futur<* pr«ctxcs will
centlnue te faver the new fersi, regarcJleos ef the past er hew
it may be designate*, since eeenesiic effectivenes'^ pr-^^pre
-4C.
, v: ' r'*t -
^l
^U'-
n«w t» be as valid a criteria as ^ny •th^r* Is tfeis rtg«r4>
107
w»nt »f tfe« C4n€ept: '
Thus Ti^wed, ««a8ur«d rfgulsrljr and uslf^i^Xy,
r«p€&t«»d In %h^ syc<j**s??iv^ wars tm the farw
•f reprisal a and Aimiag mt th# «c©!s®«sic is*-
Ifition »f the ^ppestng bellif'#rf»y!t must be
r#gar^«<f »» ^eytlepai^nts ef the latent priacltle
•f bXedc&de, mianely, tJ^st t>i«» b<(»lli,5«r^st vbe
peases-ses? ttee efj>etiv« ee^Kan^ ef tl» »e« is
entitled ta ^errlv® his eppenent ®f tb** use
thereof fer tlie purpeee ef a«iriratl»» by his
ewR Teasels er #f ce?w»y-=:r!|r ^si n^utr^l vessels
such ^m4» 4rs are ^eetine^ te »r •rigliiate
C»n«id*rinif tj^e ran^e ef tke caedern !%'jicl«&r sulH^arine*
10(6
and itg -sisiiiai fueling requi.re-?.ent», "^at well «,s tk«
*«»t.:uct.iv# c«p«teilitf d^aeaitrjfetttfi in tw« *erl4 fears fey its
eeav«??iti«n3.1 &nce«t»rs, tS^er« «fe@ul4 be little ieybt ef idsie
ability ef tk« «»4ern subr.arlR^ t«i fl®f»rce futur* bleek®slee»
Objtctiens te the pe8slbl« aiethe^ ef eafisreement «s«3t be
tesipere^ by a censii^ratien ef jpejieral intematisnal praetloi
tewaros cews!erc« 4e«truct,l»n, wliicli apr-eari?. te h&Y€ rt suite*
in n9>i, it ill -defined, iRte:,R®ti-tn<»l l^.^ in tht area.
It la tfeerefere eeneludeii that wfeile the ciai?te!sary rulea
aay be viable in respect te t>ie eeacept ef traditional
blivc ..j'. ':^: , th«y hav», dft t>^« very least, be«i aupiuessented
by the rislQir eencept ef th# «^l8taat blecks€?«» sni are, la
this respact, ®b8?-l#'t«.
*^''*' i: ODrenfcei^'fi Tr-t^x-TTiati^n*! -.sw 656 {6tVj »^, n, r,auterr:£«?.bt
edl* 19^'^) •
308 As early ap I960 th<t ntiel ^ar p^i.<<tr?!d Tr1 t,fs>,n circ-umn^^vlt^iitfrd
th«« earth wlt^jeut surfacing f«5?r fuel, er etterwl^e, 5<»e Sea





Tk© ^•et«i»n-4Baker In future conflictg irlll find hlaidlf
f«c«ci vith several •pti^ns ies t« th« c«n^uct •£ the w«r,
d«p«a41n£ 9n it® totality ^ and thm nature •£ tli« «fii«Bi3r» 7%i«
g#al« f«r KhleH h« wmy Btrlr% will !;»€ li!nu«need by the
military arid «c#not*\l€ »ri«ntati«R hm «u8t fxnistrate.
Obvicvialy a laa^ p#wer with littla aec«»« t» tfe« «#a will
pt9B^n% fe*? apfartuRltias far aarltia* eaaaarea attritien,
but aaf «all pravida legitimate targats far 8«iba«rina» 9r
atbar, bambarc^ant • If a ^al la abtal»abl« t^raugh aeanaRie
•|M»r8ua»lsii" rath«>r than silit^ry annihllatiaa, %h^m thm
dagraa mf faroa required ta reach tha gaal say fall vaXl
within eanvaatianal ll^sits* The vary raal d«iii;«r that a
tatal war aituAtian cawil^ r»»ult ia caiiplet* alii^ilEsatiaa af
th« b«llii?erent8 an bath sldas will bapefully <l«t«r the
praspaeta mf sueh a eanflict* KsM*«v«r ta strategieslly
ignare the paasibllity af such tanfllcts ifiTlt«» disaster*
^« Ca®aarea Dagtructia|ft
F^anamie paralysis ia reeagnl^ad a® s legitimata gaal
ia warfare and aasRiire destructian af e&e&iy eiNimaree achi«T»8
that result* The ilaaisiafi-^alcera mf the p«iat, idian faeatf
with the ehaiee mf prelangeii ^mr^ mr paa«ibl« defeat^ ehasa
»42<.
nm







t# tip tli« scalft**? in ffk^f^r •f saiiltary ii«c«0sity, »n0 by 8»
d^tni, »ter«(r»t«f! tfe# eust»3iary rul«s feeUiiif^ ^fe«» sub8jarin«
skips* the ju^i^en^ *t l^urwsbtrf left the fi*l^ •>;#« t*
th« future with •nly r«e#iit practice as a ^i^«.
mibsMtriHK «rs#n»l far sui^'f^ri*r t»titeat ^^'istlmg 1». ^.«rl<^ w^r
XI, any ^I»b«l «#nflict •f th« futur* will b» ««r» '^t^tal"
than p«»t t«taX esnfiicts* C«nc«rn i^ill b« €iir«ct««l t«
mati«n«l surviir*! fund it i» «i»8ily p»stuIst<Ml tli«t unr»Btrlet»
•4 m^MMrine warfare, if d««»«4 n^cess^ry f«p emrvival, wHl
b« tfc« tm1%* Practical c#ii»i«»rati«R8 rtfar^^iaf pr^bablt
^•8tnicti»n by r#tali»t»ry **tap«ii8 will preclude waraing
servant v««8«Xs pri#r %m attack, &nd th« e«nt5nuin^ pr»bl«aft
•f siSA «a4 er#w li»£t&ti«»e will milit3t# against pris9
cr«w« and tka r#«€u« af survivars. ^'usianltftriiks canelfftr-
atiana im^^r th«8a c«nditiaB8 will nat b« l#8t, hj% by
!ia««8&ity will ba lifuit^-l ta praclu^inr ^alib«r«t« h#©tiUt^
afAiast sunrivara a»i, possibly, ta satifiestiaft i»f tb<tir
pasitian if tl*« allitary sito^tian ptrmits.
2» Ba?abarclffiftnt
Tlia past daaa nat afftr th* j^rapfcic i^uideline® ia t>4is
ares t^iat »ay ba fauni ia raapf^ct ta catTii^serce destructiao.
Futura daeis^iaaa ean anly ba paetulsit^d an thm exist^nea af







^ neiJ^ , « r y,' jfi. it-aft^
*^ i"
-,* *••
destruction •;>f sjilitary isbj^ictives adjacent t@ uricief#Re*«[.
clti<^s nslS'^s pr®bl«^si8 fur future ^«cl«i»n as t© tht ^«»irrff«
•f l#^itiatt^ ^.oPtr\JCti;i>n m«r<» than th« l»flti!?iaey ®f tb«
tarret, Th* vsii^ity »f t^i* fsilitery ^bJ^'Cti v^, in th«
f«n«r*I c»nt<?xt !&f the vwrfilX conflict, snd th« €^*iJrr«« •f
f«re« r<*a8«nibly c<»eci*f? n€Cf^ss«ry t* «cc#r«5plish t> * #bj»^c-
tlve, will d«^t«»rf3in* tK« legality ftf th* degtn:2Ct5s5n. It
is Ilktly, h©v/€fv«r, tV;«t any «neiEsy ar#a havlri.?*^ s»ith^r
©llit«rv Ji*r ec<?ri«ft3ic isp«rtsoc* will b^ m-nBt4«rmi -^ valitf
•bject yf attack.
C«»riBid€r1 njr the g*^'®^*-^ t^estructlv# p^ttt^tial *f l»nf
rmnir*' fubnarirj* 3Jiesil«'», " ^ne would af,r«e th&t it vf««Xd
•bvi©u8ly be •>-:»sirabl#! %& M^&rn th« !S'..^-nca8ibat&?iitg; in tt»
tarr«»t 2«n<» prifr t^ attack. A s^urfacf'd, «r subf8!»r.«^'e^,
subtncrinf siiltht well find this r^quirf*;3i#r-t ls3|"#6sibl» s^inc*
raci^^s \.>rninf,£ vr-jlf? *xp«f5» it t^ lmfn«ci*te ?fi*ftructi«n.
It aay tl-«r»f-^rf be aesumrd th^t ^prrsti^na} necessity will
prfclurip warninirs r-ri^r ti^ attack srifinatin^ fr©§5 a s?ub-
iBar'.ne in r^!,i -speriiti^fial eituatir^ne, alth-i^urh this d®«»
n»t prtscIu-Sp th<» possibility ^^f the warning eriplrisjtlnf
«l8»whcre.
Tb« csnc^ft «f tbe l«nf rangt, »r distant, blockade an
-_
'^ It is *stiroat««l that t^-e f'«>lar3Ji rsi£5eil« is capabl* «f






ftfiftthAr metr^^a »x ccszxamic *ttrit.l»n appears t® o^ well tn-
tr«fiehe4 ss «» aspect »f t»t«l wurfsre* life* a^ba^^rinn,
contrary t« '^'^tf^ sri'vi'-snal-/ r^e#imis?«d, sr-T^-^srs ts> b* sia
continuing tr«ii^ t#%f«r^» ^at»e destruction of e^-jiatrct a« «n
cni in vsrf«r<«, it is pr«j«ct«^4 tl^st th# «f«el3t»n-jB£ki*»r's ©f
til* future will fiRd it f«fisibie t* utllis>t tht subm&rt&%
t* tb« fulltst #jit«tit c»»pfctibie wit!^ r«c*|mi^«d intftrnstSsial
Xaw.
Fwir tfeat l#eftl. »r Iitxiit»4, conflict* «dll gcf^t-l «ret»
lnt» ««j«r ©•fiflicts Ap«r»t*si *s a <i#t«r«at t« tfee «>
•f belliirwrtnt •bjfetiv«s« Tfeft p«ri»4 8i^s«^U9fit t* ls«rl4
fear II h»» %e»ft «ark#<l by th» '-Jrlet^ne^ of s#v#ral of
tl»e$« |!«#gr^ pi- ie& 11?' •rlcmted c:«afXiet8* tb^ui far «uek c«b«>
rr9nt«tl«08 hSif^ b«ftii n<»tftbl« f«r their l&ek of r«p#rta^
mibB«riB« 4ietlvity« ^i« in k««piaf ndtte th« fs«t tfeat
8iaJ«r »ub®*rlii«' aetiirity h»n b*«B txpfri^ac^i in th« past
•sl^r in th«s« eonflietft i^hlefe approaels^d ti»t«l ^igi«nsidtii»*
Tb* pitimtiail «ntrfeiic« ©f tfee «^!^»rin« iiit« tbis "^^'^-^ -sf
ir«rf«r« requlrtB » tt«saltf«rdti«n «»f Its p«»slble r#i«, #r
r«I«8» p»rtiml«rly in vl«w of tfe« pr*b«billty tfeat •nly in
Il^it<Mi warfitr« situatians ean a true bail«me« b«tv«9n




ne «« « ^i.^ a-r;








Im limited 'i!?ar sittt«ti'§B.t im tli« futur«, it m^f b«
p»stulst«d tliat. the ii«clsi«n-^«k!»rt will ptfee «f.fiirts t^
<iff«rt8 that slfjst liicr«at# %hm sse»pe tf %'h« e«'«flict«
Ctna-eqiasntlj, if it fe«e@58«.© B«e««S4irv - 1# iitiliK# tfe« «mb->
Burins t« 8tifl# a b«llig«r#at*® fl«w «f s®?»«rG«, it is
pr«b$»bl« tfest pttlitieal rtality will ii»c«8fiitat« rea«#asbl«
easpliaiiet witfe ti>« c#:isveRti«&sal malts re^Mriin^. e»fsm«re«
destruction,
^* Sasbar^ftut1—I———lai iWi iii niW* III-
It aay b« ajisim«4 that, is t^« limited war sitma.tiaE
P«ata3.st«4 abave, tra^itiaaal wmmpt&B s^4 trs^itHu^l nilts
w«uld b» fav®r*?«l far naval b»mb«r^<siBt, Sueb b®mbsrdm«Bt
wauls laf,ic«lly b« lissit«<il ta fir* fr^ws surf»c» vascsls
ratbar tbaa attb«arin« lauaebad wiesilas. Cajisiiarlng tb®
^«n^*r ®f ace<»l*r*ti»f!i, daeir^l»w-.m®k»r» iwulffi b« >mrf!r;t*is^ffi.^^j
:,. .;.: :fy th« utlllis-atiaii af & auclear missila, i^n4 l.'r&&
tba ataiiipaist af «eaiia«y, tb# as«,#f a e«Bv#??ti®naI stib-
maria^ lalasil^ is unlikely* Guntraitw «*'-.«--^^kiiig| t%M r»l«
•f tfea «ibmar.tna in bai8bar4m#iit m»f b« e^asi^erf*4 a#gligible*
in th« lissitai v^r «itisatian#
3* B^a^it.f^f
Future li^aitail VMrf^ prabsbly rf^prte^nt tb« anly ecea^ana







e«nsldfrre^ feasible, since iiiE^sriG^lIy it i^as & dev«l»p»
sent «f tteis typt «f c«nfr»nt&ti9n* The deelsians •f tla*
future c>5uld i/ell result in a c«?rd©n «f i^'srp^^lra nr:*»v#r»tin^
aecdss #r d»p«.rture fr©sa eneiJiy p«arts, ^s envisiontc uad^^r
th« cu»t©8ii^ry d««trln« •f bl»ck«(d«, Siieh & bl»ck«id« c«uld
be fxp^ct*?^ t» b« ©••pt»««5 »^ b»th BU]f*f«e» vessel a smi «ub-
»ftrln«8, 6inc« in tbe Il}lt«S a»r>«et c<!ntempl&t«d, visit and
saarchy and passible eenfiseatian, w«ul14 be tbe daisiredi f;esl»







HftvlBip «x»8!in#^ b»th the past aRs5 th« future. It n«w
»pp#ar.^ p«sfilbl« t» c«^pare the pr^babls?* c««rs* ^«"' tb# lett«r
with tli« hvmknit^Tiistn f»sl8 pr«vl$U8ly p^stulate^ as b<ii&g
«l*slrdblft attrlbixtes mt siib««ri{i« warfare*
A« Cmmmrem DestractlMi
Aa aa isstrueifnt «f c»ri^^rc« destructive it ar^^cars
likaly that the subeaarin* will retain Ita |^re*esine»ee in
tmy laaedtat«ly fereaeeable cenHict* Tli« example ef the
past l&ileat4»g that In a tetal w&r situate em t^e cuii^temar^r
rules wettid net prevail. Ofir*strictt<i aubisariite warfare can
lejf^cally be expeetec? te be th* rule ratber tfesB tbe excfrrtiee.
Uacjier eaelt eemlitleiae It Is likely tl^at prevent len ef
lemeeeaeary ea^ualties^ preteetlon ef nentrembatiirats, and
reeejF^ltiee ef neutrality will ©fain be seceaitary censider-
atiena.
Tbere exist* a prebability that in limited ware» limlte«S
beth as te ree^rapbie area ^m4 as te the nimber ef parti ci>
pants, tbe i^als y/iill be reall%«(!« In such a eentext,
belllcereats wetil«i hesitate te vlelate a nersi whicb «ftl|^t
bring th^ wrath ef a pewe-rful neutral, ehift tbe balaaee ef
ef werltf eMnien sfalast thmi^ er accel^rste the eeuflict









tfcftt th« c#Hc«pt •£ mllitftrr aaceselty >dll net be a« press*
iRg in a limited wsr wliere ultls»»t« survival is n»t th«
&• B#8}bsr<t»ent
In view 9f the destructiv* e«p«billty •t the a»i?«rfi
aissil«^ c«rr5'lnf siiba^irlne, th« p^esibllity »f nairal bf>sibArd-
M«nt fr»« suck ir#s«el8 p»s«8 tr«n4»it^«tis pr»bl<^s, Th#
trsc'itl^nal niles n^veminn; n6T«l b»flibfir#«i«nt •ri^rinatsi,
«»4 wer« c«^ifi«d, ^e» the <S*ek ai«iint«d c&rm^s w«8 the
principl« w««c*n .f#r 8«<sli warfare. Witfe its limited r«ag«,
9mA r«nerfilly «itcell«at aceuracy, th» probability mt stich a
i««jip«ii d«iiif ^cteneivt diamagt •utside a target area was lisiit*
«i« Th^r* v?aB, «n^ is, a r^asanabl* exp«etatian #f rtalisiag
hu5ianit»ri&r5 jraals w^.il« utiH«in|: this typ« %t w««p«b,
••siaainf that tfe« «xistiR|? rules in this r«ipird ar« absftrve^*
In tli« ab8«ne» af a uniyer&ally accept^ ban ^a t^a usa
•f nuclear weapans tba difficulty «f scMevinit hu»anit«riaa
lie
«B<l85 in a future t«tal war situatien is obvi«U8«' TK®
axtanda^ r»nga af a siisiiile brings within firing! ^lataoc®
^^*^Unit^^N^tian» Ganaral Asft^jbly r^^^olutian 1653 (XYI) af
24 Nav«!r*b«r 1961 J dtcl&res th® uee af nwcl«ar weapans t» b«
illi'fal «nd '•contrary ta th« spirit, l?»tt«r an<l aims af the
Unitf^d Watiana", and alsa castrsry t© the rul«« af int^rnstiand.
law and humanity. Vvith the ej£c«rtiaft af the tJSrE, n*a« af tb<»
aajar pawers vatad far Ian ^f the rasalutlan. Far this
raasan, and ather», iti ing farce la qu#; tianabla. Far a
dlacusai an an tha effect ef tb« r«a®lutl»n an^ tfea pa%««ir af
the af- '^>' ta l«fl»latr, st^a f^aaer^lly, O.T, Asamaah, Tfea
Lagal _ ..fieanea af the DecXaratians af t>^* n«r«rsl ?s?^«^bly









t«rg«ta which eanntt b«? »eea, ealy cslctjlatit^» Fvea th«
»ll|^t«»»t h«a&n #r »«chiRe err»r c«ul^ result in t«tsl
destruction •f \intarg«t«d ertss. In sd^itl^s, a ^ir<sct
Huclfesr hit en th« <l#s'.l|p:i«t«Ni tarf:tt 18 »# pi«r«nte« af




Thu axasplas praaant^d in th* psst by psrtl«r? t^ tha
t*« tat&l canflicta af thia century wri? inn«?stt£i tfi® laag
raaga blaeksda, vdt:- its «tt«*n«tant asiphftsia aa uaar tatal
<astr\icti«»n af aurfsce caa*sarc«, indicate fully tha ci»ursa
tb&t futurs^ t.?.t&l conflicts aey be «>:p«cta4 ta fallow.
Haavy rtli^nca an th<* 8«b«arina ta anfarca balllgtrent ab»
jfsctives vfill raie« th?* saamt issuers vhicb v^re <?5 s'^-iis's^sS
uncier thf -.tiiiru' tapic ©f c^sinerce s.esi.ructiaii« in L^a
apinlan af this writar, tha submarine will play ttren & laritar
ral» in any f^Mch futura canfliets* Oppart?jfiitv t.® r^h^^rra
hti»anit^>ri&n prfictieaf^ will ba presant, but t\ics pri.ctlca«
will aoca »*aiR ba limita* by tha a??e«Sflty vs^lcb aparatians
will i)?»t •»?!** an tha 8ttb««rlR« caasmander.
JA* •^•T,/'lfer4c ^ D, H. Barnes, S«» r^vftr »nd its Maaniiif
is ^stliRfitacI as balnj;: at l*ast 2500 Eiilaa.
-5C-
> * » "« •» l'» Jl f- -:r'.
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', Rp-cenciliiitlen ©f Future Trends v/ith F®stul£t#*d G»als
>ssuRjin/r, the validity ®f the trends «3<a^ined, Is it
possible f»r international sociRty t» reconcile these trends
in such a manner that husaanitsrian f'osls csn continue t®
b« valid considerations in sub.-iiarine warfare, and if s«,
how?
It a&y be arfued that s vigour«us «nf«>rcem«nt of the
old nilea respecting coauaerce destructien, as reprfsented
by the 1936 London rr®t©c®l, would accomplish that ^ni in
this area. However, a realist Kould be forced to conclude
that the old rules, if they \^<?re ev^r a valid statement af
the international lavr in this area, died at the hands of
international practice, and were buried £t N\ireiRbe,rg» It
is an unfortunate truism that the bulk of "enforcement" of
int*»mati«nal rules in th® war lav; area is accomplished
after the fact ©f violation at tribunals convened, or in- .
stigated, by victorious belligerents. Future enforcement
of these rules would require & tribunal infused v'ith equal
parts of hypocrisy &n4 unreality,
Internati nal practice does not appear to have ante-
dated the trfediti'-nal rules /^overninr naval bombardment.
Time itself has accomplished this act. Enforce ftent of
exiFtinr doctrine v/ould completely ignore the vast tech-
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n^laglcal advunce© whlc^^ render questionable tb« «pi>Itca-
bility of conventional biMi«nlt«r5.«.i» crlt#ris. ?^.«c©gnlt1.®js
•f %ht. chan«« coupled with realletic attesptss to t.n««t th«
htj»anltftrian cballtnre i^ a is#r« r^tiansl course ©f action.
The ec^ncert of the lonjr*rstnrr bloekaf5e haa rendsri^d
•bs»l«*t.e, «*yc<*pt in lijsite^d »itu»ti-:ms, th# traditional
•l^@rt-rsnrft or '^clfti"**" blockade, fh® fcan!!5,«ic succ«???.s
•n1©y«^d t» a result ©f the appllcstlen <.?f tfe* nfv? version
lr>dicat#fs th^t fctte^npt© t-= arply traciitis^nal concepts
would h«? fruitless. The appliciibility ®f the »ub?isrine
te the loRfi-rjen-f* block§ri« p#®««; important msblesirT in de-
ttraininf th<? j:-«»rmifssibl«* lissltf?. of subffi&rin® activity.
Two further c»ur©«£? of setion art «»p*»n f®r cc^nsldi^re*
ti»n, i.e. I sbsnd»nt3«\nt @f the subnarine as a w?«srsr; of
war, or f^nsulstion -.'f n^w uno r<»8liEtic rtJlc^s f*?r the
c^?nduct of r.yb?asrin<& ©psrsti^ns in futurf? cm^flicti^, Tb®
p0.«?<5ibllitltrt far th<? succ^^ss .-sf th«- fonsr»r sr« r«»?r?®t<B,
Pas-t practie^- i'-.ciic&te© th^ unlikelil.eed f?f outlawing th»
use of ®n effective military weapun by agre«^«fnt. ^^-^nsually
th** r>V»:'?;^'^ is trii?' v.'K*?n )K'i:c^- WP.&^.-tin^. s r#» r<«»S{3«f Sf^d bv the
»*j«3rit> .r5f thfrs lnt«5misti.;.>n»l C"5ja?sufilty , or by thi^ asre
p«w«rf\il ?5f th« potential helllfwr^ntss, TM« has been
de«5>ris^trat<'d in t?'* 'r-.-'-f by ree^i^.fiitlo-n ^^f t.v^i^ hi|;h ©xpl«»-
siv?-- shell, s;<^r«rn<pl» »nd t)'<*; torpedo «r l#,i?:iti®«t#
w«at>^ns of war, «n^i by the pre?'«nt f«iliir<«s t® «ffactively





fNlftS*86 th««, Accordingly, s.ny &tt«;^^pt t& siEC^rf. th* cub-
arine «£ & w-:fip«ri sr.i'uid fee re^^arded as prt*@rGa'sned to
fall.
It rmna^r^f- finally to deterssine w> ^tth^r new <^@ctrin*«
Cim be ti«v«l.$pe<:j w Ic-^ will permit msoci^tucs utilizijitl^sn ef
the ??ubmarine's p©t«?ntlsl ar & w^espon r?.th9wt t®»t&lly ne-
gating: b«ric rimardttriftn g©«il». As s prfrais*? such rul«»8
should b^ fisrf-iulated »« as t^-^ be appllc&ble to conditions
•f both li^rdted and total bellirerency. It is rati©n&l t0
presume t! s^t under tie conditions vlEUUlized &t. e:Kieting
in future t©tal c nflictf;, any c&nfr^ntstl^u betvf^^en
necessity and humanity will result in a p«r«im©ui^t c^nsi-
dtretlon sf tbe fc'r»er. Unr*»alir-lic rulrs , ar- evlcs^^ncfd
In tt.e j:ia©t, car. sinly lead U'> breeches, *ehic> in turn
require ^;>nly ?sinor extension %:> becoaie tot&l ^ierefrsrd*
If sny seasblance of huiTjar.it&rian order if; tc- be pTi»ferv«*d,
Bucl rules, wM3e j'^eintaininf ®pp©rtunitif*Si f^r jaltigation,
nurt be capable of application under the ^sst extresie con-
ditions.
The aest recent codification sf rulf»s« re^srdlnf f,ub-
«i«rlne warfare occurred in 1936. I'Ulcs drafted in the
early twentietb century t^till hsve pap^r aut-^rity, at
lea^pt in certain areaa of rubaarlne activity. Fven earlier
custo-^&ry coctrlnefi pre©.?^Rtlnate. Cleiirly t^':e tlsse Y»$. c©.^e
for an international body to re-evalu^'^te tr f^ existlnjfi;
8tan<iarda. It ie submitted that the follawinfr 1? a rea-
.c«^
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llFtic starting f-«int tsn which »uc^ » l^dy mif^'t buil^l »n
RIILTT ?^?.f PIf!TTWf!f Cr-fif'f'CT T'^^^Hff' fUFTICF ^'f!***^'^l.P>
(1) It is recatr * thi^t subss5rin«^ vess«P:ls, be-
eauee of p^:culi-:^.-__ i- in cfr^ifr, C'-nrstmcrlar'
,
and ©perstinf «nvironm«!nt ^ «r*^ net inherently
govern th« c^-'^duct ©f surface waretlp®* !*r©wever,
in thf c-'JG.duct: of v/arf®r^ «r«"'net ;?:«*rc' «fi.t v«»r.f:<*-'i ?
,
©•wwindinf ©ffic*rs ?>.f giib8!sr1n*?fj si. fell makt every
•ff©rt, rot i'"C'r.?;ir't,*»nt r-ltr tT^ BP.f^ty i>T t\ tir
enmmtmi, &r tbe c#mpleti©n cf tktir »fsigned mis-
fiir^n, tt:? inrur?* t^ f* wfill-belnf rf tl:** crew «nd
passenrfT?: t^f tbi;* vtsr-*?--" undtr attack* •
(2) Such efi.>rts :^^¥, in apt^l.lcebl« {sltuatlsns,
inclu'''!* r.^^T^nltt 'rir tK;€? cr«?^^? S;r:d psp9<i*nr.'<&rf ^^ a
tar.*?et vessel t-s abandon »>^.ip ,r<ri©r t© attack;
^i.^frslllRr t'r.t r«s-tlcn r^f surviverr t^^ p?^'t -^r«t.-f .sl
rescuers; takirijF w©imdftd &r abl# b«di«d survivors
©n boArri thQ Duba*=srine vessel; provid'nf! f'^#df-tuffs
r ai«dical supplies to survivor?; afl??f*t, and such
otb.er }utt;.'.r?it srisn c-jnd'uct sr. tbf ccnfnsin,d ' n,^ ©fficf^r
iMiy de«r3 advisable under the circumstances o.f his
sstp^rati^-nal C'5msiitt?:^ftUts.
(3) Und^r n© ci rc«a«tsnc#s sssy the cam'^-'.and' n^ affic<»r,
©r erftw oT b submsrln©, tsk?* deliberate a.rfr^s«5ive
8Ct^.•>R sralnst, tb?- survive rs -'f & c?ftcir^y«d vessel,
unl*®s suc" s\irviv!»r® C3>ai.^it acts w):icv ©ndanfer the
safety ©f tb«^ sub'msrint ^r crew.
(4) Vessels cleerly d<nsirnat*c^ ss h-^apital shirs, in
accardence witl' the previsions
€»f Ir.terneti^jnsi isnn,
shall nat br j.vub.1*ctfd to sttacl^ ynlf'.fs such vessels
have aband >«f»d tKeir medical function in favor ©f
military pursuits.
The fellawinu pr©p®©al f^r rul^s f^verrlnf naval b^m-
bar^ftent will be seen to be an adaptati€?n of tb-sj-^e
presently stated in the Laws Of ?'avftl \-st.Tt&rf i
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the uee a.f any tj-pe »f prs j«!«ctile flr«fd ©r l».unc)?v«l4
by surfa«« ©r subaarine vessels at terre«tri®l tar-
gets .
(2) All «nesv5y installi^t.;. /r.t' ^f a JR-Ilitary natur*;
tr-'irerar)'- -^^r r;»>r";-sn«»r}t C'>nc«»ystr^t3.i!in5 of tr^u^pe,
equipment, «nd suprHf^s, und ineiuftrisil fit^K ti»n-
.?;s^ed In th?f ••?anijf2'f?t-iir*» of war msttrlal , ^say b#
C''.nsider<*<:^ leg-ltirsste tarfete*
(3) Any --^structlan of clti^e, t«>^ms, villages, er
sit'- i& p^^^ibit^d, ?ucb areiss will n©t b« b©wb©rdf5d
unless 1 ^p-lti'^fit** t.arf'-i^ts are- fr«*!5<*nt and cart-^r* i^f
sucK tarf*tF bv swr -^r allied rc-rcr-a is nat feasibl#'.
(4) K>:en*'V«r a t;>"5i r«^d abjective nmy b# abtsin^d bj:
nucl'^sr df'vlc^s, suc^: w^«p©?)0 vlll be utlliaftd.
^l-afl*» ^xr^^dl^ncy will ^fit diet**-.* th« ehoiee t>,f
(5) 1-f t'- «^ utilizati^^n i>f Rucl**ar Kanr-rs-oi^ Ir r«-
qylr*j<j, a V'ff^ay.von wil'^ b« C--085**''' which will iacc'»'a|0i8b
t^« faliitsry abjective witb th« l««st p®s-slblt fUr#ct
8.??*-i 1'"'Cl..'i«?'ntiS»l r!ucl'*-?^r C'-^nseq^i'^nc**^ t-^ the l©eal
populace*
(6) Known c inc«!*ntrftt1, "^n© <^>r nonc^esbstsnts?; ^<t^*ical
«8t.dbH8h'n<*fits si'--c u'nits; r*11. <^lous, *:l«?t ^^ricsl , a?s<!
educational instituti'^as will nmt b# ?sad€ th# d«ll»
Th# f®ll»wlnf sugfftsted rul«© art e©F?.sld»red t?> b« ©f
g«aer«l spplicctlon in tV* r^fi^je af blockade:
FOLrS ^mr^-7-:CTT'^€ BLOCKADE
(1) Th« t<*rtf^ blacksidft 4%-\^t»f*. j? b»llir©r©nt actl?>ii
«r,alnct «n enemy, or em^'^des, calculated t^ interdict
th« fr*«» fl®w a.f -"^siritl^ft c©.'T?'s.«»rc« t^ -sr fr^m the
(2) A blockade ia n«t effective until the bl®ckadln,ir
pa'^ty t^sf given notice t-:* other int«r«'Sted psrtlt»s
_<^'^«•y?*"
.-^ H ; flp ." ^(7 ini3
>>>•?
» »-*»; r 1-* ## »j r>-« 5' I
.j* .' "^ ('i * rf5 . V:. '- V
.»•
••ff-*)i
•*_ IT r »; 's '^ i'\ t^n sj J )
tfe« -'#«.rr»|5Mc limits 5*f th» bl»cksd«| «isi
A rrac*» perli»d f^^r the wlth<fr»>*al ©f «ff«etnd
srippinr saw b% declared,
(3) ^- blocksde may be «rif»rc*d afsln.^t all p^r-
tl#»8 !^«vin^: notice by alrcraift, and aurfscft snd
sub-surfecf? w&rsMps, subjt?rct, ^evev«r, ta In-
ternational l#w gdverning the esrtduGt ^f such
aircrsft and vees^ls,
(4) T^ b* binding on all th<^ pi*rtli»(J. a blecksde
must )^« dllif;ently «nf^rc«d by th« bisckading
party.
(5) A bl«ckad<* re'.?:«1nff in effect until withdrawn
®r until the isilitary d^feet &f th« bl^^ekedinf
p«rty»
Thi» r©rejfoing, w/ilf! not ."Offered »b » pan&.c^c. "'^-^
th« Ills afflicting ir*t«»rneti-.>RSl law 1b w«rti?e«, h»p«-
fully 0ff^r e;-^t3r©ee: ^f conduct wMeh enr. b« re«:lit3t.ically
appliee t--- ffiprrsitiaaail sut^'?!,«rlri« conditians, wMl* ^till
r8»t«lnin,F «pp$rtunltl«s for th# ©ffisctuatl^n ^f fewaisnl-
tarlsn reals' In wartiaje. It I?' flrisly b««lle"¥^d that th*
©IcJ rul?s ®^'?v:.;Id hit ':iii5C»rded, sine© sltrsugh tb,©^ ^;:£y
«ffer .*. -.^i!!* utility In tb« ll?9itrd war situ^tifm, 8 ruli*
whic"^ ^s aT?plle3bl<* tc e-nl-? thst sltuetJan cs&n. be of
little value to tri» a*cls1^ra-:??«k??r fSiC«?Q with 4* tetal
©•nflict*
Vlbil« tb© jiu^restpd rults 1?^- soa« aspects r<?rri'*s«'nt
9l 3urrenri«r of ©ld«r, siar© ?u:'-en^- conc#p^-f^ t* trif irsrsh-
n«8« of sur techn®l«?fic«l a/t, it is? bfli^Vf^^ tb«t tbey
•l3© r*prj?!?i»nt « n«c«0'8ary stef f^rwurd w^'dct- will prf^vw-st
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%h« paying af lip s«rvicc to d«ctrin«s whlc^ fail t© «c-
c^rd with either l«*f:&l practlc >r nuclear fisct snr? wMeh
CUR only r«^8'.,ilt in th«ir c«»!ft.pl«i.« dlsr^rartl wl^^n n«»c«»»ity
dictates. It is a s-»rt^ anc ^eey .«tftp frot^ disr^far'-i ^f
»n« •uttmded concert, rei^firdl®ss ef * ^ '^ '^'^•narent juetifl-
c«ti«n, t^ disreirfird ®f all lei^al c^^-ncepts, n© matter h«K
vftlid,
y^'sr jftt it® bast will ©bvi©usly n«ver be feiaaen^, and
efforts to C6®plffi't«ly huiaftni^e conflict ar» deomed to
failure, H0v/ever, 8 c<5R!5ld«rgtion df th« nuisibsr of
threatened liver- in r?5®dlern vi@i«ri«3i« incre&ste tiie urfescy
of frafslnf rulee wkicb will, within th« l*«way left by
ailitskry urr^ncy, C'3>sif^r^ii to the dictates ©f hyiB,anity.
tl^e 3Rim«diate tack required is t^e re|:uIatioTi of oaval
trarfarf-, from the standpoint ©f th«? submarine, In such
a mannfT th^i th«* utility of th<t subsJJi^.rlne, its need fer
surpri???- anc secr^^-cy for i-s: . ; ::t »ff*ctlv r-ration, as
w«ll as th® clffiitar. ^f neutrals and n*»ncombatarstf t© i:^-
mur>ltY snd the overall (S^^.»nrii?. 'jf huaanlty, can b«
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